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INTRODUCTION 
As the sun rises over Boise, Idaho, on April 16, 2017, more than 
100 young men are lacing up their cleats, trudging into warm-ups, 
deliberating game strategy, and otherwise adhering to the Sunday-
morning rituals they have developed over their careers as competitive 
ultimate players.1 This particular collection of college athletes, 
representing universities across the western United States, has 
descended on Boise State University’s campus for the weekend to 
compete in the first round of the college ultimate postseason.2 The 
teams are already several games into the tournament, having 
completed pool play just the day before.3 The games they are about to 
play will determine who advances to the next round of the postseason 
and whose seasons come to an end.4 
Conspicuously absent from the scene unfolding on the fields, 
however, is a nationally ranked team that has won every single one of 
its games up to this point: Brigham Young University’s CHI (“BYU 
CHI”).5 Repeating a story that had unfolded similarly in seasons past, 
the Brigham Young University (“BYU”) ultimate squad entered the 
first round of the postseason as a top team, beat all challengers on 
Saturday, and then summarily packed its bags and went home, 
forfeiting all of its qualifying games on Sunday and effectively ending 
 
 1. See Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC, USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/
events/Big-Sky-D-I-College-Mens-CC-2017/ [https://perma.cc/6F4C-W5CD] [hereinafter 
2017 Conferences]. Although the sport is colloquially called “ultimate frisbee,” many of 
the sport’s athletes call it simply “ultimate.” See, e.g., Victor Mather, A Sport Without 
Referees? It’s the Ultimate Debate, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/17/sports/ultimate-frisbee-debates-a-role-for-referees.html [https://perma.cc/3KXV-
HBBD (dark archive)] (using the term “ultimate” but acknowledging that the sport is 
“popularly known as ultimate Frisbee”). This distinction stems from the fact that a 
“Frisbee,” a product trademarked by Wham-O Inc., has not been the sport’s official 
regulation disc since 1988, when Discraft discs were chosen to be the standard disc of play. 
PASQUALE ANTHONY LEONARDO, ULTIMATE: THE GREATEST SPORT EVER INVENTED 
BY MAN 2, 8–9, 29 (2007); see also DAVID GESSNER, ULTIMATE GLORY: FRISBEE, 
OBSESSION, AND MY WILD YOUTH 256 (2017) (discussing the sport dropping “Frisbee” 
as a product and a name); Ultimate, DISCRAFT, http://www.ultimate.discraft.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/PE68-7E6V] (advertising Discraft discs as the official disc for USA 
Ultimate). This Comment will refer to the sport as “ultimate.” For a concise explanation 
of the sport, its history, and how it is played, see GESSNER, supra, at 7–8, 32–38, 49–57. 
 2. See 2017 Conferences, supra note 1. 
 3. See 2017 Schedules and Standings for Big Sky D-I College Men’s Ultimate 
Postseason Tournament, USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/events/Big-Sky-D-I-
College-Mens-CC-2017/schedule/Men/College-Men/ [https://perma.cc/BZ7L-3BJY] [hereinafter 
2017 Schedules and Standings]. For an explanation of tournament formats, see infra notes 
60–62, 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 4. See 2017 Conferences, supra note 1 (showing that the teams finishing in the top 
three would advance to the next postseason tournament). 
 5. See 2017 Schedules and Standings, supra note 3. For an explanation of the team’s 
name, see infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
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its season.6 The team yet again sacrificed its chances of advancing in 
the postseason and pursuing a national championship, all in 
observance of a higher calling. 
The team left the tournament early in order to comply with a 
BYU policy that prohibits its athletes from competing on Sundays.7 
For years, the team has tried to convince USA Ultimate, the sport’s 
governing organization, to accommodate its members’ religious 
observance.8 These fruitless efforts, as well as the effects of BYU’s 
and USA Ultimate’s respective rigid policies, have for years fomented 
great controversy in the ultimate community. More important, 
however, the situation has left in its wake a bevy of unresolved issues 
between the parties, some with potentially momentous legal 
ramifications. 
This Comment uses the incipient conflict between BYU CHI and 
USA Ultimate to analyze how anti-discrimination laws apply when 
religious calendars and college sports schedules collide.9 This 
Comment seeks to use the legal and historical development of this 
area of law to extrapolate the legal implications present in the dispute 
between BYU CHI and USA Ultimate. This Comment then aims to 
use the novel set of facts to ascertain and assess the claims that BYU 
CHI may be able to bring against USA Ultimate. Finally, this 
Comment suggests a new mode of anti-discrimination analysis that 
borrows intent- and effect-based aspects of burden-shifting tests to 
better address effective discrimination when people in a protected 
class encounter societal systems, structures, or schedules that 
effectively discriminate while refusing to accommodate. 
 
 6. In 2015, for instance, the team won all five of its pool play games on Saturday 
before the bracket games took place on Sunday. See 2015 Schedules and Standings for Big 
Sky D-I College Men’s Ultimate Postseason Tournament, USA ULTIMATE, 
https://play.usaultimate.org/events/Big-Sky-D-I-College-Mens-CC-2015/schedule/Men/College-
Men/ [https://perma.cc/2JLF-KTRH]. 
 7. For a discussion of BYU’s policy concerning competing on Sundays, see infra 
Part I. 
 8. For a discussion of BYU CHI’s unsuccessful lobbying efforts with USA Ultimate, 
see infra Section I.B.3. 
 9. While commentators have robustly discussed “the intersection of sport and the 
law,” much of the discourse concerning the legal implications of discrimination in athletics 
has oriented around federal laws such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title 
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. Thomas M. Hunt & Janice S. Todd, 
Powerlifting’s Watershed: Frantz v. United States Powerlifting, the Legal Case that 
Changed the Nature of a Sport, in SPORT AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL 
INTERSECTIONS 75, 75 (Samuel O. Regalado & Sarah K. Fields eds., 2014) [hereinafter 
SPORT AND THE LAW]. This Comment focuses instead on possible applications of the 
Constitution, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and various state anti-discrimination 
laws to an instance of alleged religious discrimination. See infra Part II. 
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The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the legal 
history of religious discrimination in the context of sports. This part 
looks at National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and 
collegiate club sports, as well as BYU’s particularly storied history in 
this area of law. Part II analyzes BYU CHI’s potential claims under 
constitutional, federal statutory, and state statutory law. Finally, Part 
III suggests a new mode of analysis that would provide a more 
equitable means of handling alleged effective, unlawful discrimination 
in a societal structure. 
I.  BACKGROUND: ISSUES WITH BYU, RELIGION, AND COLLEGE 
SPORTS 
A. The “Y” in All of This10 
Brigham Young University, located in Provo, Utah, is a private 
university founded and owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, or, as many know it, the Mormon Church.11 The 
vast majority of the school’s 33,000 students are members of the 
Mormon Church,12 and the university implements an honor code that 
requires students to abide by Mormon values and encourages 
behavior in line with the Mormon Church’s teachings and 
expectations of its members.13 School policy requires students to 
respect Sundays, the Mormon Church’s Sabbath, as a day of rest and 
religious observance; this particular rule prevents the university’s 
 
 10. BYU is often colloquially referred to as the “Y.” See GARY JAMES BERGERA & 
RONALD PRIDDIS, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY: A HOUSE OF FAITH 273 (1985). 
 11. Missions & Aims of BYU, BYU, http://aims.byu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/JB65-
KS4Y]. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is uniquely “Americana” in that it 
is “the only world-recognized religion to have been born in the United States during the 
modern age.” DARRON T. SMITH, WHEN RACE, RELIGION, AND SPORT COLLIDE: 
BLACK ATHLETES AT BYU AND BEYOND 20 (2016). For more about the history of the 
Mormon Church, including its founding and development, see generally MATTHEW 
BOWMAN, THE MORMON PEOPLE: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN FAITH (2012). 
 12. See BYU Demographics, BYU, https://web.archive.org/web/20150424094326/http://
yfacts.byu.edu/Article?id=135 [https://perma.cc/Q692-CUAN] (showing that, in the fall 
semester of 2014, 98.7% of full-time undergraduate students were members of the 
Mormon Church). 
 13. See University Policies, BYU, https://policy.byu.edu/view/index.php?p=26 
[https://perma.cc/6TR9-CHEK]. Much of the honor code concerns matters such as 
academic and personal integrity. See id. (“All who represent BYU .	.	. are to maintain the 
highest standards of honor, integrity, morality, and consideration of others in personal 
behavior.”). Furthermore, it mandates baseline levels of decency and behavior for 
everyday propositions like maintaining physical appearance and consuming foods and 
beverages. See id. Since early in the university’s development, religious and academic life 
have been closely intertwined. See BERGERA & PRIDDIS, supra note 10, at 47. For an in-
depth review of the BYU Honor Code and other behavioral policy mainstays, see id. at 
93–130. 
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athletes from competing on Sundays14 and has thus led to the current 
conflict between BYU CHI and USA Ultimate.15 The ultimate team, 
though, is not the first at BYU to experience scheduling issues 
stemming from the Sunday-play prohibition. Instances of various 
outside parties resisting requests to accommodate the student-
athletes’ religious observation litters BYU’s rich sports legacy. This 
perennial conflict has placed parties squarely at the intersection of 
convenient sports scheduling procedures and concerns about 
potentially unlawful religious discrimination. 
B. BYU and a History of (Alleged) Discrimination in Sports 
As sports have grown from a purely recreational activity into an 
immense commercial industry, discrimination and inequality issues in 
sports have mirrored those in American society at large.16 BYU is no 
stranger to this parallel phenomenon. For decades, BYU’s athletic 
teams have experienced myriad difficulties with scheduling due to the 
university’s prohibition on Sunday play.17 Throughout this time, the 
school’s teams have had to work with, lobby, threaten, or otherwise 
convince various organizations and governing bodies to craft 
schedules that avoid conflicts with their religious observance. Overall, 
the university’s sports teams have successfully obtained scheduling 
changes, but often they have had to resort to applying varying means 
of pressure—sometimes legal—on their counterparts.18 This section 
will review those instances to provide subtext for the current conflict 
between the university’s ultimate team, BYU CHI, and USA 
Ultimate. 
 
 14. Adam Epstein, Utah and Sports Law, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 107, 110 (2017); 
Jeff Call, Never on Sunday: BYU Won’t Compete on the Sabbath Day, Regardless of the 
Consequences, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City) (June 25, 2016, 4:45 PM), 
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865656920/Never-on-Sunday-BYU-wont-compete-on-the-
Sabbath-Day-regardless-of-the-consequences.html [https://perma.cc/S4HG-7RS3] [hereinafter 
Call, Never on Sunday]. 
 15. See Daniel Prentice & Charlie Eisenhood, Florida Warm Up 2019: Tournament 
Recap (Men’s), ULTIWORLD (Feb. 13, 2019), https://ultiworld.com/2019/02/13/florida-
warm-2019-tournament-recap-mens/ [https://perma.cc/T359-D3RY] (“BYU, owned and 
operated by the [Mormon Church], has a university policy that forbids athletes from 
competing on Sundays. That has blocked BYU’s path to Nationals in ultimate, and USA 
Ultimate has not made accommodations for the team.”). 
 16. Introduction, in SPORT AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at xiii, xiii. 
 17. For a summary of these difficulties, see Kevin J. Worthen, The NCAA and 
Religion: Insights About Non-State Governance from Sunday Play and End Zone 
Celebrations, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 123, 127–30. 
 18. See id. at 128–29. 
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1.  NCAA Sports: BYU’s Baseball Team and a Short History of the 
Sunday Rule 
The sports-scheduling issue first arose in the context of BYU’s 
NCAA19 teams.20 Schools that participate in NCAA athletics—
especially large Division I schools21 like BYU—provide substantial 
funding and support for their sports teams with scholarships, budgets, 
and well-recognized allowances for student-athletes to miss class or 
other school events in order to represent the university on the playing 
field.22 In particular, BYU has committed significant resources to its 
NCAA athletic programs by constructing state-of-the-art facilities 
 
 19. The NCAA is the primary governing body for major college athletics. ADAM 
EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 57–58 (2003). 
 20. Worthen, supra note 17, at 127–30; see also Call, Never on Sunday, supra note 14 
(noting that the NCAA created “The BYU Rule” in 1963 to “accommodate [BYU’s] 
position on Sunday play”). For a chronicle of intercollegiate athletics at BYU, see 
BERGERA & PRIDDIS, supra note 10, at 269–304. 
 21. The NCAA has three major division classifications: Division I, Division II, and 
Division III. Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-
multidivision-classification [https://perma.cc/N5B8-FAZS]. Member-institutions—i.e., 
colleges and universities—with NCAA athletic teams generally fall into one of those three 
categories. See id. While one difference among the divisions relates to varying internal 
rules—such as the minimum number of teams each member institution must have—the 
most conspicuous external difference arises from the fact that Division I member 
institutions can offer full athletic scholarships that attract better athletes, which in turn 
effectively increases viewership and revenue generation. See id.; Our Three Divisions, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions 
[https://perma.cc/6H29-UVGN]; The Difference in the College Division Levels, NEXT C. 
STUDENT ATHLETE, https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/how-to-get-recruited/college-
divisions [https://perma.cc/N5K2-B5HN]. For example, BYU, a Division I member 
institution, generated $67,733,712 in sports revenue in 2016. Brigham Young University-
Provo: Revenues and Expenses, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. POSTSECONDARY EDUC., 
https://ope.ed.gov/athletics/#/institution/details [https://perma.cc/6K9T-9A3J (staff-uploaded 
archive)]. 
 22. See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 58; Greg Johnson, Managing Missed Class Time Is 
Part of the Game, NCAA (Jan. 11, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/
media-center/news/managing-missed-class-time-part-game [https://perma.cc/TXS3-RSNX]; 
see, e.g., Academic Processes for Student-Athletes: Class Attendance & Travel, U.N.C. 
CHAPEL HILL, http://www.unc.edu/sacs/March2016/Web_Public/Docs/3.2.11/9.0-class-
attendance-travel-policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/G47Y-VPF5] (providing that UNC Chapel 
Hill student-athletes may miss up to seven days of class per semester for athletic 
competition, but noting that exceptions may allow for more missed class and that “[s]ome 
teams require [such] exceptions”); see also Anna Orso, Penn State Athletes’ Perks Include 
Scholarships, Housing, Food, Entertainment, PENNLIVE (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.pennlive.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/05/as_ncaa_reforms_loom_a_look_at.html 
[https://perma.cc/U6E4-FFDF]. But see Andrew Carter, As College Athletes Travel More, 
Missed Classes Come into Focus, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Dec. 30, 2017, 11:41 AM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/duke/article192121459.html [https://perma.cc/
WH23-SXR3?type=image] (reporting on the increasing frustration of professors whose 
student-athletes are missing more class due to travel as conferences expand 
geographically). 
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and “awarding generous athletic scholarships.”23 BYU has also 
provided its NCAA athletes significant institutional support through 
other means.24 
BYU’s NCAA baseball team was the first to experience 
significant postseason scheduling issues.25 The team performed well 
throughout the 1958 season and postseason, qualifying for the 
NCAA’s College World Series.26 The World Series schedule, 
however, required teams to play on a Sunday.27 BYU requested that 
the NCAA alter the schedule in order to allow them to play, but the 
NCAA denied the request, effectively ending BYU’s season.28 
Just three years later, BYU’s baseball team again had a 
successful regular season, but this time the NCAA altogether 
declined to invite BYU to participate in the postseason due to the 
team’s Sunday-play policy.29 Foreseeing future conflict, the NCAA 
soon thereafter crafted a religious accommodation rule that 
prohibited scheduling NCAA tournament games on Sundays when a 
competing institution had a policy against Sunday competition.30 This 
rule became known as the “BYU Rule,” or the “Sunday Rule,” and 
despite some instances of wavering commitment from the NCAA,31 
the rule has largely remained in effect.32 
 
 23. BERGERA & PRIDDIS, supra note 10, at 279–80. 
 24. See, e.g., Academic Services (SAAC), BYU, https://byucougars.com/story/athletics/
1281428/academic-services-(SAAC) [https://perma.cc/J3KW-3UN8 (staff-uploaded archive)] 
(detailing BYU’s Student Athlete Academic Center, which provides services and support 
to facilitate and bolster student-athletes’ academic success); Incoming Student-Athlete 
Frequently Asked Questions, BYU, https://byucougars.com/dl/sites/default/files/2017-08/
Incoming%20Student%20Athlete%20FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/A244-GRUJ] (providing 
information about how BYU student-athletes “have access to an academic advisor, 
content-specific tutors, a mentor, and a learning specialist,” among other academic 
resources and support). Additionally, the school has given its NCAA athletes greater 
flexibility in certain scheduling matters, including allowing student-athletes to postpone 
their mission calls so they can compete contiguously throughout their athletic eligibility. 
BERGERA & PRIDDIS, supra note 10, at 280. A prominent feature of the Mormon faith is 
an expectation that young men serve as worldwide missionaries for one- or two-year 
periods. BOWMAN, supra note 11, at 188–90. For many, this call to serve occurs sometime 
during their college careers, which is why the exception is important for BYU student-
athletes. See id. at 189 (noting that “the age for [missionary] service was standardized at 
nineteen”). 
 25. Worthen, supra note 17, at 127–28. 
 26. Id. at 127. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 127–28. 
 30. Id. at 128. 
 31. In 1998, the NCAA, eyeing increased television exposure and other financial 
incentives and noting that it was not “legally required” to implement the BYU Rule, made 
moves to eliminate the policy. Id. After an internal comment and review period and 
lobbying from BYU, however, the NCAA opted instead merely to modify the rule, 
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2.  BYU Rugby: The Second Coming of the Sunday Rule 
Issues stemming from the Sunday-play prohibition, however, 
have not been limited to the realm of NCAA athletics. Like most 
other universities, BYU boasts a robust club sports program that 
allows students to compete athletically outside of the NCAA 
context.33 BYU’s non-NCAA sports program, which includes both 
“extramural” and club sports teams, allows students to compete in a 
wide variety of sports,34 albeit without the same level of funding and 
support that the school’s NCAA teams receive.35 Arguably supreme 
 
expanding its scope from allowing schedule changes for only Sunday competition to 
allowing schedule changes for any day on which a competing institution has prohibited 
athletic events for religious reasons. Id. at 128–29. Furthermore, the new rule allowed the 
NCAA’s individual sports to waive out of this policy if it presented onerous scheduling 
burdens. Id. at 129. The latter rule opened the door to the NCAA’s women’s soccer and 
women’s basketball divisions to obtain waivers that allowed them to abstain from 
implementing the BYU Rule, effectively threatening to prevent BYU’s teams in those 
sports from competing in the NCAA postseason. Id. Yet again, lobbying and mounting 
pressure from BYU led those sports to revoke their waivers, thus allowing the teams to 
compete. Id. Shortly thereafter, the NCAA readopted a blanket rule requiring all NCAA 
sports to alter championship schedules as needed to accommodate schools with a policy 
prohibiting competition on a particular day for religious observance; this rule remains in 
effect. Id. at 129–30. 
 32. For example, the NCAA recently accommodated BYU’s men’s golf team at the 
men’s golf national championship by allowing the team to play on a Wednesday instead of 
the scheduled Sunday. Ryan Lavner, NCAA Accommodates BYU with No Sunday Round, 
GOLF CHANNEL (May 17, 2018, 7:26 AM), https://www.golfchannel.com/article/golf-
central-blog/ncaa-accommodates-byu-no-sunday-round [https://perma.cc/S5X4-VDE9]. 
Also, for context, BYU and Campbell University, located in North Carolina, are currently 
the only Division I institutions that maintain policies proscribing Sunday athletic 
competition. See Worthen, supra note 17, at 128. 
 33. See Extramural Sports at BYU, COUGARCLUB, http://cougarclub.com/
athletics/extramural-sports-byu [https://perma.cc/WDQ4-SESX]; see also Club Sports, 
DAILY UNIVERSE, https://universe.byu.edu/sports/club-sports/ [https://perma.cc/UH25-
B4KK] (reporting on BYU’s various extramural and club sports teams). 
 34. See Extramural Sports at BYU, supra note 33; Find a Club, BYU STUDENT 
ORGANIZATIONS, https://clubs.byu.edu/clubs#/ [https://perma.cc/6C83-9YLS] (compiling 
BYU’s club sports teams and other clubs into a searchable database). 
 35. See James Littlejohn, Extramural Sports Require More than Just Effort, DAILY 
UNIVERSE (Dec. 4, 2007), https://universe.byu.edu/2007/12/04/extramural-sports-require-
more-than-just-effort/ [http://perma.cc/HME8-9BRL] (discussing the various levels of 
non-NCAA sports at BYU and the nominal to nonexistent school funding those teams 
receive). In fact, BYU CHI receives no funding from the university. Emilee Erickson, 
BYU Men’s CHI Ultimate Team Looks to Remain Top-Ranked, DAILY UNIVERSE (Feb. 
27, 2019), https://universe.byu.edu/2019/02/27/byu-mens-chi-ultimate-team-looks-to-remain-
a-top-ranked-team-1/ [https://perma.cc/6SAC-F6ER] (stating that BYU CHI “is not 
funded by BYU and has to come up with funds on its own”). The varying levels of 
recognition and support that BYU’s non-NCAA sports teams receive result from the 
university’s hierarchically structured club sports program. Littlejohn, supra. The 
extramural sports teams (women’s and men’s lacrosse, women’s and men’s rugby, men’s 
soccer, and racquetball) sit atop this hierarchy, are fully recognized, and receive 
substantial funding. See Extramural Sports at BYU, supra note 33; see also Jared Lloyd, 
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among the extramural teams at BYU is men’s rugby.36 The program 
has experienced resounding success, averaging only one loss per 
season for the past twenty years37 and recently winning four national 
championships in a row.38 
The rugby team, however, had to fight fiercely off the field to 
position itself to win those championships on the field. Starting in 
1984, USA Rugby39 began scheduling its intercollegiate National 
Championship Tournament to take place over a weekend.40 Given the 
schedule, the championship match was slated to occur on the Sunday 
of the annual tournament.41 Thus, despite its dominant regular season 
performance, BYU’s men’s rugby team could not compete for the 
national title because it adhered to the school’s Sunday-play rule.42 
The team and the university, both of which felt as though they were 
being discriminated against for their rules on religious observation,43 
lobbied USA Rugby for twenty years to change the tournament 
 
Ultimate Frisbee on Upward Course at BYU and Around the Country, DAILY HERALD 
(Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.heraldextra.com/sports/college/byu/ultimate-frisbee-on-upward-
course-at-byu-and-around-the/article_5dd77c45-1864-5094-99ca-8a254aa6c25c.html 
[http://perma.cc/4ZAK-UV4T] (noting that BYU CHI “would love to see [BYU] raise 
their status to a similar level as rugby and lacrosse as an extramural sport”). 
Nonextramural athletic clubs are tiered into “recognized,” “in transition,” “restricted,” 
and “not recognized” categories. Find a Club, supra note 34. Support from the school 
varies depending on the team’s designated tier. See Littlejohn, supra (discussing funding 
differences among extramural sports and the various club sports); see also Sean Connole, 
BYU-CHI Ultimate Frisbee, GOFUNDME (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.gofundme.com/byu-
ultimate-frisbee-team [http://perma.cc/K7SP-7NS3] (stating in a crowdfunding page that 
“BYU does not recognize CHI as an affiliated sport or club,” which means BYU provides 
“no funding, field time, or transportation” to the team); Lloyd, supra (noting that BYU 
CHI “has no official ties to the university,” which means that the university does not fund 
the team). 
 36. See BYU MEN’S RUGBY, https://rugby.byu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/D5KS-4CEY]. 
 37. History, BYU MEN’S RUGBY, https://rugby.byu.edu/content/history [https://perma.cc/
ME46-SJ76]. 
 38. Awards & Honors, BYU MEN’S RUGBY, https://rugby.byu.edu/awards-honors 
[https://perma.cc/X3H7-UHGL]. 
 39. USA Rugby serves as rugby’s national governing body in the United States. See 
About USA Rugby, USA RUGBY, https://www.usarugby.org/about-usa-rugby/ 
[https://perma.cc/W8QH-KKYM]. 
 40. Call, Never on Sunday, supra note 14. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. BYU’s associate general counsel, David Thomas, said, “We felt we were being 
discriminated against because we were exercising our religion.” Jeff Call, Legal Scrum in 
Past: Pressure Is Now on Cougars to Deliver Victories, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City) 
(Apr. 2, 2004, 3:23 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/595053284/Legal-scrum-in-
past.html [https://perma.cc/K8UB-5CX6] [hereinafter Call, Legal Scrum in Past]. Jared 
Akenhead, the team’s coach, said, “We felt there was some discrimination in not letting us 
in and letting us challenge for national titles.” Id. 
942 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
schedule so the team could play for the national title.44 For twenty 
years, though, USA Rugby refused to change the tournament to a 
Friday and Saturday format, citing class schedule and financial 
concerns.45 
In the early 2000s, BYU and its men’s rugby team finally decided 
to pursue a more pressing method of negotiation: threatening legal 
action. The team recruited an attorney-alumnus to represent the 
school and its rugby squad.46 Having informed USA Rugby of the 
newly obtained counsel, the university assertively intimated that legal 
action was on the horizon.47 BYU moved with more than deliberate 
speed, quickly drafting a complaint and warning USA Rugby that it 
was ready to file suit and formally start litigation.48 USA Rugby, with 
the options of either engaging in expensive and potentially protracted 
litigation or conceding to a resolution satisfactory to BYU, finally 
agreed to alter its college championship schedule.49 It took twenty 
years, but in 2004, BYU Rugby was finally able to compete for the 
national rugby title again.50 
This particular saga presents an interesting contrast to the 
NCAA issues that began years before. Whereas the NCAA opted to 
create a special rule soon after it perceived the possibility of 
scheduling conflicts in its many sports, USA Rugby implemented 
change only after the threat of a lawsuit inspired them to act. The 
differences in approach by the two governing bodies may be 
attributable to differences in purposes, resources, and general 
context.51 
 
 44. Id. For context, the team had a 241–11 record during the period in which the team 
was unable to participate in the National Championship Tournament due to Sunday 
scheduling. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. As discussed earlier, the NCAA governs major college athletics for a wide variety 
of sports, and the organization’s member schools generate enough revenue to often give 
them significant flexibility in traveling and scheduling competition for certain days. See 
supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. NCAA student-athletes also receive substantial 
institutional support from administration and faculty, which allows them to often miss 
class in order to represent the university with relative ease. See supra notes 21–24 and 
accompanying text. While precluding Sunday play for special circumstances may present 
some difficulties, the NCAA has the resources and clout to overcome them. See supra note 
31. Additionally, to the extent student-athletes miss more class because competition is 
moved from the weekend into the school week, universities’ policies regarding their 
NCAA student-athletes diminish the chance for repercussion or reputational damage in 
the eyes of their professors. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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The factors at play in the rugby conflict were significantly 
different than those typical in the NCAA setting. At universities, club 
sports, like rugby, which do not fall under the NCAA umbrella, have 
much less institutional or reputational clout, making it more difficult 
for student-athletes to receive approval to miss class during the week 
in order to play in games or tournaments.52 Furthermore, club teams 
often receive much less, if any, funding from their schools, meaning 
that the students must find other resources or pay out of pocket to 
participate.53 Also, USA Rugby is a much smaller governing 
organization than the NCAA, and it is oriented around just one sport. 
USA Rugby, therefore, must allocate much of its resources to more 
than just the college levels of play, like adult club and various youth 
outlets. In terms of financial wherewithal, USA Rugby relies on 
membership dues and donations to cover costs of operation, which 
generate only a limited budget.54 
Overall, the NCAA had the institutional capacity to more easily 
implement the BYU Rule. USA Rugby, on the other hand, was 
assessing its own capabilities, and those of its student-athletes, by 
aiming to maintain a weekend tournament format. Some of those 
same limitations, especially budgetary ones, also led to a quick 
capitulation once BYU threatened legal action.55 Indeed, whether it 
intended to or not, BYU’s men’s rugby team implemented a 
 
 52. See, e.g., VANDERBILT RECREATION & WELLNESS: CLUB SPORTS, OFFICER 
HANDBOOK: REC CLUB SPORTS PROGRAM’S POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND RESOURCES 
GUIDE 17, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/recreationandwellnesscenter/clubsports/club-sports-
handbook-2017-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DSD-XGHC] (requiring club sport 
participants to directly discuss potential class absences with professors, who are not 
obligated to allow students to make up missed work, and indicating that club sports 
commitments “do[] not excuse a student from academic obligations”). 
 53. See Crimson Staff, Fund Club Sports: The Athletic Department’s Hypocrisy in the 
Spotlight, HARV. CRIMSON (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/
2014/10/28/harvard-club-sports-funding/ [https://perma.cc/7YY5-BRH5] (lamenting the 
lack of funding that Harvard University club sports receive from the athletic department); 
Owen Hill, Club Sports Struggle for Funding, OCCIDENTAL (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://www.theoccidentalweekly.com/sports/2016/03/01/club-sports-struggle-for-funding/
2875867 [https://perma.cc/ZXC9-PPU2] (detailing the expenses that Occidental College 
club student-athletes must pay in order to participate); Gregory John “G.J.” Vitale, Here’s 
What College Students Don’t Know About Playing Club Sports, ULOOP (Oct. 10, 2013), 
https://tufts.uloop.com/news/view.php/101237/college-club-sports [https://perma.cc/BFL9-
6A27] (observing the difficulty of financing club sports at Tufts University); see also 
GESSNER, supra note 1, at 159–60 (discussing the financial difficulties of traveling to 
ultimate tournaments). 
 54. See U.S. Rugby Football Union, IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt 
from Income Tax pt. VIII (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2016) (reporting that approximately 
eighty percent of total revenue in fiscal year 2016 came from charitable contributions and 
memberships dues). 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
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prelitigation strategy that capitalized on USA Rugby’s budgetary 
limitations: the strike suit.56 The team achieved its goal by forcing 
USA Rugby to evaluate its ability to afford litigation. This strategy 
becomes especially interesting in the context of a statement by BYU’s 
counsel in the rugby affair: “The law is clear that you can’t exclude a 
team based on religious beliefs.”57 In reality, though, the law on this 
issue is actually quite unclear,58 which presents the question: Was 
BYU’s threat to sue a bluff that USA Rugby failed to call? 
3.  The Ultimate Version 
A conflict similar to the one between BYU and USA Rugby has 
been developing over the past several years, but this time in the 
context of a different sport: ultimate. Although foreign to many, 
ultimate is one of the fastest growing sports in the nation.59 
 
 56. This concept borrows from business law and other areas of law. See David 
Orozco, Strategic Legal Bullying, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 137, 157 n.97 (2016). Essentially, a 
strike suit allows a party with greater comparative litigation firepower than their 
counterparts to garner a favorable result simply by threatening a lawsuit. See id. at 138–39 
(discussing the fact that parties “increasingly wield the law aggressively as a blunt 
instrument for strategic .	.	. purposes”); see also Strike Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining “strike suit” as “[a] suit .	.	. often based on no valid claim, 
brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated 
settlement”). In other words, the strike suit is a strategic tool that uses the threat of 
expensive, protracted litigation to force weaker parties to settle before a complaint is even 
filed. Orozco, supra, at 142–43. Since the stronger party knows, or at least bets, that the 
weaker party will concede defeat, the threatening party can assert “a baseless legal 
position to derive advantage by exploiting the high cost of the legal system as a barrier to 
seeking a remedy.” Id. at 143. “[T]he high cost of litigation .	.	. becomes an important 
factor in the strategic decision-making process since the bullying target is unable to 
finance its day in court. Knowing this, the [stronger party] can discount the cost of 
litigation since a quick and favorable settlement is likely.” Id. at 155; see also Gary Myers, 
Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J. 565, 565 (1992) (observing that instances of 
what the author calls “sham litigation” are on the rise in anti-trust litigation). Although 
litigation tools such as the motion to dismiss can mitigate an attempted strike suit, see 
Orozco, supra, at 175, there remain real financial risks involved with calling the plaintiff’s 
bluff. This fact is especially relevant when the law on the particular issue at hand is not 
imminently clear. Furthermore, strike suits that result in settlements prevent judicial 
precedents that clarify the law. The conflict between BYU and USA Rugby provides an 
example of this, as anti-discrimination law in that fact pattern has yet to be tested. Indeed, 
now the only relevant “precedent” to point to is BYU’s success in implementing a strike 
suit to force a tightly funded sports governing organization to give in to scheduling 
demands. This historical backdrop has set the scene for another potential showdown 
involving very similar parties—BYU CHI and USA Ultimate. 
 57. Call, Legal Scrum in Past, supra note 43. 
 58. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 59. About Ultimate, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/HPZ9-52SY]; see also USA Ultimate Membership Trends, USA 
ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/membershiptrends/ [https://perma.cc/42YH-J5Z5] 
(detailing rising trends in participation). For context, ultimate is a team field sport played 
on a pitch that resembles a football field. See GESSNER, supra note 1, at 7. Play consists of 
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Throughout its formative years, as the sport became more structurally 
organized while remaining largely at an amateur level, the weekend-
long tournament developed as the most common format of play.60 
Such tournaments generally consist of “pool play” on Saturdays, the 
results of which dictate how teams are placed in “bracket play.”61 
Bracket play most often takes place on Sundays and culminates in a 
championship game.62 
The sport’s governing body is USA Ultimate, a 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organization based out of Colorado Springs, Colorado.63 
The entity was founded in 1979 with the goal of legitimizing ultimate 
as a sport and bolstering its growth and organization by facilitating 
various levels of play and spearheading outreach.64 The organization, 
which currently employs twenty professional staff,65 focuses much of 
its resources toward facilitating its primary levels of club play at the 
youth, adult, and college levels.66 
Although all three levels of club play are thriving, the college 
club ultimate scene, in particular, has developed rapidly over the past 
several years, with increasing participation67 and greater 
 
two teams of seven people on the field, and the object of the game is to advance the disc 
from one end of the field into an endzone on the other end of the field. See id. at 7–8; 
Steve Courland & Neal Damba, Ultimate in 10 Simple Rules, USA ULTIMATE, 
https://www.usaultimate.org/rules/ [https://perma.cc/5XLQ-UPM2]. 
 60. See, e.g., Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC 2014, Schedules & Standings, USA 
ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/events/Big-Sky-D-I-College-Mens-CC/schedule/Men/
College-Men/ [https://perma.cc/9ZS2-VKCX]. 
 61. See, e.g., id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. About Ultimate, supra note 59. 
 64. LEONARDO, supra note 1, at 29; see also GESSNER, supra note 1, at 71–72 
(detailing the organization’s early grassroots efforts to connect players around the country 
in order to grow its base and legitimize the sport); USA ULTIMATE, USA ULTIMATE 
(UPA) CHRONOLOGY, https://app.box.com/s/tqx77es2cwz1vryk7lrj [https://perma.cc/R79Y-
H5GZ]. USA Ultimate also represents the United States internationally by fielding teams 
that compete at international tournaments like the World Championships. See 
International: USA Ultimate National Team, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
national_teams/ [https://perma.cc/H4CC-6ZPA]. USA Ultimate is a member of the World 
Flying Disc Federation (“WFDF”), which runs World Championship tournaments. Id. 
Recently, WFDF became a recognized member of the International Olympic Committee. 
See id. For examples of the national teams, see USA Ultimate National Team, USA 
ULTIMATE, http://nationalteam.usaultimate.org/ [https://perma.cc/PP6S-AKKH]. 
 65. About Ultimate, supra note 59. 
 66. See USA Ultimate’s New Bylaws: Governance and Leadership for Ultimate in the 
Next 10 Years, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/news/usa-ultimates-new-
bylaws-governance-and-leadership-for-ultimate-in-the-next-10-years/ [https://perma.cc/3W25-
SU5L]. 
 67. College Division, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/college/ 
[https://perma.cc/SH57-73KR]. Currently, over 18,000 student-athletes represent their 
colleges and universities on over 800 teams at USA Ultimate events. Id. 
946 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
legitimization through developments like USA Ultimate’s deal with 
ESPN to broadcast college championship tournament games.68 
The formal college ultimate season occurs in the spring semester, 
running from January through May.69 During the season, most 
“sanctioned” regular season games—those formally recognized by 
USA Ultimate—are played in the conventional weekend tournament 
format.70 By compiling results from sanctioned games, USA Ultimate 
utilizes a connectivity algorithm to create rankings throughout the 
season.71 These rankings are then used to allocate “bids” that have 
postseason implications.72 The season ends with the “Series,” which is 
a sequence of three postseason tournaments that lead up to and finish 
with the National Championship Tournament.73 These postseason 
tournaments advance from conference championships to regional 
championships to the National Championship Tournament.74 
Conferences and regionals are geographically based qualifying 
tournaments, such that teams must place high enough at one in order 
to qualify for the next round of the postseason.75 The aforementioned 
bids determine how many teams advance from one round to the 
next.76 The final objective for teams is to reach the national 
championship game. 
 
 68. See id.; Charlie Eisenhood, USAU Signs Historic Three Year Deal with ESPN; Will 
Add Live Games on ESPN2, ESPNU, ULTIWORLD (May 23, 2017), https://ultiworld.com/
2017/05/23/usau-signs-historic-three-year-deal-espn-will-add-live-games-espn2-espnu/ 
[https://perma.cc/3GCH-G9ZJ]. 
 69. College Division, supra note 67. 
 70. See Tournament Calendar: Tournaments & Other Events, USA ULTIMATE, 
https://play.usaultimate.org/events/tournament/?ViewAll=false&IsLeagueType=false&IsClinic=
false&FilterByCategory=AE [https://perma.cc/Z4CP-XEQ2] (listing sanctioned USA 
Ultimate tournaments throughout the country). 
 71. See Teams & Rankings: Rankings, USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/
teams/events/rankings/ [https://perma.cc/AU32-STGR]. 
 72. See, e.g., Teams & Rankings, USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/teams/
events/team_rankings/?RankSet=College-Men [https://perma.cc/LWK2-QUDF] (showing 
rankings and bid allocations for men’s Division I college teams for the 2017 season). 
 73. Season Guidelines, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/college/
guidelines.aspx [https://perma.cc/F7EF-7P2C] (detailing the postseason structure and 
progression in the “USA Ultimate College Series Overview” section). 
 74. Id.; see, e.g., 2019 College Season, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
college/ [https://perma.cc/SH57-73KR] (offering a schedule for the 2019 college 
postseason). The postseason tournament names are often shortened to “conferences,” 
“regionals,” and “nationals.” See Season Guidelines, supra note 73. 
 75. See Regional Boundaries, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/college/
default.aspx#boundaries [https://perma.cc/SH57-73KR] (demarcating the boundaries for 
the various conferences and regions). 
 76. See Season Guidelines, supra note 73. 
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BYU is one of these universities competing at the college club 
level.77 The school’s team was founded decades ago but has yet to 
earn fully recognized extramural or club status under the university’s 
comparatively demanding certification standards.78 Despite its 
tenuous status and relationship with the school, the team has become 
increasingly organized and has risen in legitimacy since Bryce Merrill 
became head coach in the early 2010s.79 Upon his arrival, he instituted 
a new team motto—“Competition, Humility, Integrity”—which led 
the team to operate under a new name: CHI.80 Under Coach Merrill’s 
guidance, BYU CHI has generated greater student interest and has 
performed increasingly well on the playing field.81 
BYU CHI has become a veritable powerhouse and nationally 
respected program, as evidenced by its entry into the top echelon of 
USA Ultimate’s national rankings in the past several years.82 Despite 
not competing on Sundays,83 the team has managed to play enough 
games during the regular season to qualify for a postseason ranking.84 
Their high level of success in those games has earned their region a 
 
 77. See Brigham Young (CHI), USA ULTIMATE, https://play.usaultimate.org/teams/
events/Eventteam/?TeamId=kB9yug7FXzHWqdcGUE7djiAcTF7pFOBRrxC1ZYbxWs8
%3d [https://perma.cc/3QK2-EBSL] (showing BYU’s roster and results for the 2017 
college season). 
 78. See Lloyd, supra note 35 (noting that the team “would love to see the university 
raise their status to a similar level as rugby and lacrosse as an extramural sport”). 
 79. See Marcus Awakuni, My Four Years at BYU as a Non-Mormon Player, 
ULTIWORLD (Apr. 1, 2016), https://ultiworld.com/2016/04/01/four-years-byu-non-mormon-
player/ [https://perma.cc/K5AN-G7TW] (detailing how the coach’s “professionalism and 
discipline” helped lead the team to greater success); Charlie Eisenhood, The 2016 
Ultiworld College Men’s Coach of the Year, Presented by Nike Ultimate Camps, 
ULTIWORLD (June 2, 2016), https://ultiworld.com/2016/06/02/2016-ultiworld-college-mens-
coach-year-presented-nike-ultimate-camps/ [https://perma.cc/ECP3-SGAA] (naming Bryce 
Merrill as a runner-up for college men’s coach of the year). 
 80. Awakuni, supra note 79. BYU CHI is not alone in branding itself separately from 
its university name and mascot. Early in the development of college ultimate, when teams 
rarely received support from their universities, clubs created separate identities to 
represent their individuality and independence, leading to names like Colorado Mamabird 
and the Wisconsin Hodags. See LEONARDO, supra note 1, at 95. 
 81. See Awakuni, supra note 79. 
 82. See Lloyd, supra note 35; Teams & Rankings, supra note 72 (providing the college 
men’s 2017 end-of-season rankings, in which BYU CHI finished fourteenth). 
 83. Because BYU CHI has not received the fully recognized status that the 
extramural teams have, the team does not necessarily have to follow the university’s 
prohibition on Sunday play. The team, however, follows the rule in adherence of its 
religious underpinnings. Sabbath Observance Gets Athletes Attention, DAILY UNIVERSE 
(Jan. 3, 2011), http://universe.byu.edu/2011/01/03/sabbath-observance-gets-athletes-attention/ 
[https://perma.cc/5YDZ-C2PJ]. 
 84. Teams must play at least ten sanctioned games for their results to count toward 
postseason rankings. See Season Guidelines, supra note 73. 
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bid to nationals.85 The team’s geographically allotted USA Ultimate 
conference is the Big Sky Conference, and its region is the Northwest 
Region.86 
BYU CHI, however, has been unable to translate their regular 
season success to the postseason because postseason tournaments 
take place on weekends.87 Not only do the qualifying games that 
determine who advances to the next postseason round typically take 
place on Sundays88 but USA Ultimate rules also mandate that any 
team that forfeits games in a postseason tournament is presumptively 
ineligible to advance.89 As such, due to BYU CHI’s adherence to its 
university’s prohibition on Sunday play, the team has been unable to 
advance beyond conferences.90 
 
 85. See Alex Rummelhart, Brigham Young Looks Past Sunday, ULTIWORLD (Dec. 
15, 2014), https://ultiworld.com/2014/12/15/brigham-young-looks-past-sunday/ [https://perma.cc/
F24C-JHQX]; Teams & Rankings, supra note 72 (showing that BYU CHI earned its region 
a bid to the national championship in 2017). 
 86. Under USA Ultimate’s geographically oriented postseason division structure, 
multiple conferences constitute a region. See Regional Boundaries, supra note 75 (offering 
webpage tabs that “detail the breakdown of conferences within each region”). In this case, 
the Big Sky Conference’s geographic scope is Alberta, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and a dozen 
counties in Washington. Id. (providing the Big Sky Conference’s geographic scope under 
the “Northwest” tab). The Northwest Region encompasses Alaska, Alberta, British 
Columbia, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. Id. (providing the Northwest 
Region’s geographic scope under the “Northwest” tab). 
 87. See 2018 College, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/archives/
2018_college.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NKL-YX79] (offering the weekend dates for the 2018 
conference, regional, and National Championship tournament). 
 88. See, e.g., Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC 2014, Schedules & Standings, supra note 
60 (scheduling the qualifying bracket games for Sunday of a Conference Championship). 
 89. The 2018 College Guidelines state that “[a] team must play all its games at a 
‘qualifying’ tournament in order to qualify for the next tournament in the Series.” Season 
Guidelines, supra note 73. The rules also allow for discretion from a USA Ultimate official 
to make an exception to that rule, “provided it does not affect the fairness or integrity of 
the competition.” Id.; see also Charlie Eisenhood, Breaking: No Postseason 
Accommodations for BYU; Any Earned Bid Will Stay with Northwest, ULTIWORLD (Mar. 
31, 2016), https://ultiworld.com/2016/03/31/breaking-no-postseason-accommodations-byu-
earned-bid-will-stay-northwest/ [https://perma.cc/HNA7-DV46] [hereinafter Eisenhood, 
Breaking: No Postseason Accommodations]. 
 90. See, e.g., Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC 2014, Schedules & Standings, supra note 
60. The women’s ultimate team at BYU has also recently improved enough to realistically 
contend for a spot at the National Championship Tournament, but they encounter the 
same scheduling roadblocks that the men’s team faces. See Katie Raynolds, BYU Is 
Undaunted: A Story About the Best Team that Won’t Play at Regionals, ULTIWORLD (Apr. 
27, 2018), https://ultiworld.com/2018/04/27/byu-undaunted-story-best-team-wont-play-
regionals/ [https://perma.cc/S38K-BN28]. One athlete on the women’s team recently 
lamented the difficulties of becoming a prominent program in the face of USA Ultimate’s 
decision not to “make any exception” for the team’s Sunday-play proscription, but she 
believed that the team is rightly adhering to its university’s rules: “[W]e are BYU, and 
those are our standards.” Ciera Kueser, Army Sergeant Rediscovers Unity as BYU Frisbee 
Athlete, DAILY UNIVERSE (Nov. 30, 2018), https://universe.byu.edu/2018/11/30/traveled-
army-byu-frisbee-athlete-sets-sights-high-1/ [https://perma.cc/LZ3F-MF49]. 
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BYU CHI has petitioned USA Ultimate to change the 
postseason tournament format or schedule in order to accommodate 
the team’s religiously grounded abstention on Sunday play.91 The 
team has also publicly suggested alternative formats and vocalized its 
desire to resolve the issue.92 Yet, despite the dialogue, the two sides 
have failed to find an acceptable middle ground.93 The simmering 
conflict reached a boil in the 2017 season when BYU CHI again 
earned the Northwest Region a bid to the National Championship 
Tournament and USA Ultimate again declined to accommodate 
BYU CHI’s inability to play on Sunday.94 As BYU CHI continues to 
improve its program95 and remains a top-ranked team,96 this issue will 
certainly remain relevant in the coming years.97 
 
 91. For a copy of BYU CHI’s petition to USA Ultimate and proposal for alternatives, 
see CHI Ultimate, USAU Justification & Proposal, ULTIWORLD, https://cdn.ultiworld.com/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/BYU-Proposal-to-USA-Ultimate.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CU7T-6Q4Z]. 
 92. See Eisenhood, Breaking: No Postseason Accommodations, supra note 89 
(including remarks from BYU CHI’s coach concerning the team’s disappointment with 
the postseason scheduling); Sean Walker, BYU Ultimate Team Denied Entry into National 
Tournament Over Sunday Play, KSL.COM (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.ksl.com/?
sid=39147979 [https://perma.cc/CAD4-SP2V] (quoting BYU CHI’s coach as indicating 
frustration with the USA Ultimate’s process for taking suggestions for changes to the 
schedule). 
 93. See Prentice & Eisenhood, supra note 15 (reporting that the team has continued 
to discuss options with USA Ultimate, but noting that “there has been no progress 
towards accommodations”). 
 94. See Charlie Eisenhood, Breaking: BYU Will Play in Conferences Champs, Keep 
4th Bid in Northwest, ULTIWORLD (Apr. 4, 2017), https://ultiworld.com/livewire/breaking-
byu-will-play-conference-champs-keep-4th-bid-northwest/ [https://perma.cc/7XP9-G9L7]. 
 95. Indeed, BYU CHI started the 2019 season strong by excelling at Florida Warm 
Up, a highly competitive early-season tournament. See Prentice & Eisenhood, supra note 
15 (reporting that “BYU went 7-1 across two days of competition” and beat perennially 
strong teams such as “Pitt[sburgh], Texas, and Carleton”). Writers at Ultiworld, a news 
website that focuses specifically on ultimate, asserted that “BYU was arguably the best 
team at Warm Up.” Id. The writers also projected that BYU CHI is good enough to 
contend for the semifinals at the college National Championship Tournament. See id. 
(titling the subsection about BYU CHI: “BYU Would Be A Semifinals Contender At 
Nationals”); see also Graham Gerhart & Daniel Prentice, Stanford Invite 2019: 
Tournament Preview (Men’s), ULTIWORLD (Feb. 27, 2019), https://ultiworld.com/2019/02/
27/stanford-invite-2019-tournament-preview-mens/ [https://perma.cc/CV2U-TBG8] (observing 
that “BYU looked like a National semifinal caliber team at Warm Up”). 
 96. After BYU CHI’s success at Florida Warm Up early in the 2019 season, Ultiworld 
ranked BYU CHI as the third-best team in the college men’s division. Will Johnson & 
Keith Raynor, College Power Rankings, Presented by NUTC [Feb 20, 2019], ULTIWORLD 
(Feb. 20, 2019), https://ultiworld.com/2019/02/20/college-power-rankings-presented-nutc-
feb-20-2019/ [https://perma.cc/7ZXY-UD55]. 
 97. See Prentice & Eisenhood, supra note 15 (“BYU’s continued success at the top of 
the college ultimate scene will renew questions about their exclusion from the playoff 
system.”). 
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Throughout the course of this back-and-forth, BYU CHI, while 
not explicitly threatening to sue USA Ultimate, has heavily alluded to 
a potential lawsuit.98 Public comments from team representatives 
have indicated that the team considers USA Ultimate’s actions to be 
illegally discriminatory.99 Particularly given the litigation-strategy 
precedent that the BYU men’s rugby team set when it successfully 
forced USA Rugby to change its scheduling policy,100 BYU CHI may 
consider a similar course of litigation strategy if it does not otherwise 
obtain a favorable resolution.101 
As this dispute has developed, the historical backdrop and 
discourse surrounding the present affair have brought back into focus 
a statement by counsel for BYU’s men’s rugby team: “The law is clear 
that you can’t exclude a team based on religious beliefs.”102 Yet, 
because BYU and USA Rugby resolved their near-identical conflict 
before a complaint was even filed, no court could provide that 
purported clarity. The current affair, then, offers an excellent 
opportunity to analyze discrimination law in a new context because of 
the unclear legal implications of USA Ultimate’s stance, BYU CHI’s 
confidence that the team has a legitimate legal claim, the possibility of 
another strike suit, and the novel issues that this fact pattern presents. 
 
 98. Eisenhood, Breaking: No Postseason Accommodations, supra note 89 (noting that 
Coach Merrill did not reject the option of future legal action, and said, “We haven’t taken 
anything off the table and we are considering all options, but we look forward to working 
through [USA Ultimate’s] processes first”); Walker, supra note 92 (stating that “[Coach] 
Merrill did not rule out potential legal action in the future”). In an interview with 
Ultiworld, Coach Merrill invoked the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when answering a question 
about BYU CHI’s requested accommodations. Charlie Eisenhood, BYU’s Big Day Opens 
New Questions About Postseason Accommodations, ULTIWORLD (Mar. 26, 2016), 
https://ultiworld.com/2016/03/26/byus-big-day-opens-new-questions-about-postseason-
accommodations/ [https://perma.cc/SDK2-9EV3] [hereinafter Eisenhood, BYU’s Big 
Day] (“That’s a hard question. .	.	. I think it goes down to the Civil Liberties [sic] Act of 
1964 that says you don’t discriminate on these things, religion included.”). 
 99. CHI Ultimate, supra note 91 (“Specifically, USAU’s preemptory refusal to allow 
BYU to participate represents discrimination on the basis of religion because BYU’s 
religiously-motivated policy of not participating in athletic events on Sunday.”); see also 
Eisenhood, BYU’s Big Day, supra note 98 (featuring Coach Merrill referring to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 but also noting that BYU CHI “understand[s] that it’s not 
Constitutional law, that ‘life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, and a chance at Regionals’ is 
not listed in there”). 
 100. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 101. Indeed, BYU CHI is well aware of the strike-suit precedent established by BYU 
men’s rugby. BYUtv Sports, Ultimate Frisbee Head Coach Bryce Merrill on BYUSN, 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-1fPY7YJvI [https://perma.cc/
T93T-YQQX] (hosting Coach Merrill, who observed that USA Rugby agreed to 
accommodate BYU’s rugby team “in the shadow of litigation”). 
 102. Call, Legal Scrum in Past, supra note 43. 
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II.  POSSIBLE LEGAL OPTIONS FOR BYU CHI: IDENTIFICATION AND 
ANALYSIS 
Having explained the building discord between BYU’s ultimate 
team and USA Ultimate, as well as the historical context that colors 
the current conflict, this part aims to identify and assess the various 
legal claims that the student-athletes could bring. 
A. Identifying the Potential Claims 
If it were to file a lawsuit, BYU CHI most certainly would allege 
that USA Ultimate discriminated against the team for its religious 
beliefs. The United States has a storied legal history involving 
discrimination of many kinds, and an extensive body of law deals 
specifically with religious discrimination. Under this particular set of 
facts, two veins of federal law are important to analyze: (1) the 
constitutional protections regarding freedom of religion and (2) the 
prohibition of religious discrimination in places of public 
accommodation found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Additionally, states’ anti-discrimination laws also have the potential 
to provide protection for BYU CHI. 
B. Assessing the Potential Claims 
1.  The First Amendment and Constitutional Protections for the 
Exercise of Religion 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”103 Allegations of 
religious discrimination—no matter the identity of the alleged 
discriminating party—may bring to mind the constitutionally 
protected right to practice the religion of one’s choice. For the 
reasons outlined below, however, First Amendment protections do 
not apply in this case, and BYU CHI does not have a viable 
constitutional claim against USA Ultimate for infringing on the 
student-athletes’ right to exercise their religion. 
The fatal issue for BYU CHI is that this constitutional protection 
restrains only the actions of the federal and state governments.104 
 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 104. E.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 
(2001) (noting that courts must uphold constitutional standards if a state actor is 
responsible for allegedly injurious actions); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium 
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737 (1996) (stating that “the First Amendment prohibits only 
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Thus, to state a constitutional claim alleging a violation of the First 
Amendment right to freedom of religion, a plaintiff generally must 
allege either that the defendant is a government entity or is somehow 
acting under the cloak of state authority.105 This so-called state action 
requirement106 can be satisfied with allegations of private 
discriminatory action only if the defendant’s conduct constitutes 
governmental action107 or is sufficiently intertwined with 
governmental authority.108 Mere private discriminatory action with no 
connection to government authority will not give rise to a 
constitutional claim.109 
Several tests can determine whether a private party’s actions are 
sufficiently attributable to the government to bring it within the scope 
of the First Amendment’s protections: the nexus test, the symbiotic 
relationship test, the joint action test, and the exclusive function 
test.110  
The nexus test analyzes “whether there is a sufficiently close 
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated 
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of 
the State itself.”111 Under this test, the private action is attributable to 
the government only if the state has used the private party as a proxy 
actor or has coerced or encouraged the private party to act in such a 
manner.112 The symbiotic relationship test considers whether the 
government and private party have developed such an 
 
‘Congress’ (and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, a ‘State’)” from infringing upon 
constitutional rights). 
 105. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295–96; Magallanes v. Cracker Barrel Old 
Country Store, Inc., No. 00-4231-DES, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111, at *6 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 
2002). 
 106. Lyons v. Chase Home Lending, No. 3:11-CV-1056-N, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
120100, at *19 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2011). 
 107. E.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832 (1983) 
(holding that a violation of “First Amendment rights is not made without proof of state 
involvement”). 
 108. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (stating that “the inquiry must be whether there is a 
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the [defendant] so 
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself”). 
 109. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349–50; Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 
1993) (noting that one’s right to freedom of religion is “not protected against private 
infringement”). 
 110. See Schneider v. Cooper, No. 08-cv-01856-REB-KMT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125017, at *19–26 (D. Colo. Dec. 16, 2009). 
 111. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351. 
 112. Schneider, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125017, at *19–20; see also Brentwood Acad. v. 
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295–96, 298 (2001) (observing that the 
factors that weigh into the nexus test are case specific and that “[w]hat is fairly attributable 
[to the state] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity”). 
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interdependent, long-term relationship that the actions of either, 
within the applicable scope of authority or normal dealings, can be 
attributed to either party.113 The joint action test, on the other hand, 
allows the fact finder to attribute government authority to private 
actions if the private party willfully participated in government action 
for a specific infringement of constitutional rights.114 Finally, the 
exclusive function test allows for a determination of state action if the 
private party “exercises powers traditionally exclusively reserved to 
the State.”115 Such functions have included the administration of 
elections of public officials, the operation of a company-owned town, 
and the management of a city park.116 
In this case, USA Ultimate, a private, 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organization, does not fall within any definition or extension of a state 
actor. By virtue of its status as a private entity, it is clearly not a 
conventional state actor or government entity. Furthermore, unless 
USA Ultimate undertakes some action or responsibility that 
intertwines it with the government, such as receipt of substantial 
federal funding117—which is not an issue present according to the 
most recent publicly available annual reports118—it does not appear to 
have rendered itself a state actor. 
In other cases, courts have already rejected conceivable factors 
that could have bolstered the argument that a sufficiently entwined 
state relationship exists between the government and USA Ultimate. 
 
 113. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724–25 (1961). 
 114. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453–55 (10th Cir. 
1995). Some courts have treated this like a conspiracy between the government and 
private actors to deprive rights. See Schneider, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125017, at *22–23. 
 115. Id. at *24 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352). 
 116. Id. 
 117. In some cases, government funding can intertwine a private organization closely 
enough to the government to bring it within the ambit of constitutional accountability. See 
Anne L. DeMartini, Thirty-Five Years After Richards v. USTA: The Continued 
Significance of Transgender Athletes’ Participation in Sport, in SPORT AND THE LAW, 
supra note 9, at 97, 108 (“If an athletic organization receives government funding or is 
highly entangled with the government, courts consider the organization a state actor and it 
must adhere to both the US Constitution and appropriate state constitutions.”). For 
example, BYU’s receipt of federal student aid renders it “answer[able] to the U.S. 
government as an educational institution” for anti-discrimination law purposes. SMITH, 
supra note 11, at 95. But see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840–41 (1982) (finding 
that a school’s receipt of substantial funds from the government did not render the school 
a state actor). 
 118. USA ULTIMATE, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 66–67 (2017), https://www.usaultimate.org/
assets/1/Page/2017AnnualReport_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC9W-UE2X] (listing revenue 
sources for 2017, which included no government funding); USA ULTIMATE, 2016 
ANNUAL REPORT 63 (2016), https://www.usaultimate.org/assets/1/Page/2016Annual
Report_LR.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ9Z-KJVZ] (showing that USA Ultimate received no 
revenue in the form of government grants). 
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For instance, a 501(c)(3) entity is not rendered a state actor by virtue 
of its tax-exempt status.119 In fact, courts considering whether a tax-
exempt entity’s allegedly discriminatory acts constitute state action 
have generally found no state action when the purportedly 
discriminatory acts do not involve racial animus.120 Additionally a tax-
exempt entity does not automatically transform into a state actor by 
receiving some funding or grants from a government entity; it must 
receive enough funding to create a substantially intertwined 
relationship that causes it to pass one of the enumerated tests.121 
USA Ultimate often holds tournaments, including the first-round 
postseason tournaments in which BYU plays, at public parks or on a 
public university’s playing field.122 A private organization’s mere use 
of a public park, however, does not create a nexus sufficient to 
establish state action.123 Although an argument predicated on the 
theory that USA Ultimate is a state actor because it represents the 
United States in international sporting events may seem too anemic 
to even consider, a similar case has already been litigated. The case 
concerned a Puerto Rican basketball organization, and the First 
Circuit held that status as a national representative does not imbue a 
private entity with the color of state authority.124 
 
 119. Stone v. Elohim, Inc., 336 F. App’x 841, 843 (10th Cir. 2009); see also N.Y.C. 
Jaycees, Inc. v. U.S. Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 859 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[A] tax exemption 
does not constitute government ‘sponsorship’ but instead ‘creates only a minimal and 
remote involvement.’” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675–76 (1970))); 
Chance v. Reed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 500, 507 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that a nonprofit 
organization’s 501(c)(3) status does not render the entity a state actor). The government, 
however, has used the threat of stripping organizations of tax-exempt status in order to 
indirectly compel compliance with civil rights laws. For instance, upon determining in 1970 
that racist admissions policies at BYU and Bob Jones University were in violation of Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the IRS warned that it could no longer give tax-exempt 
status to private colleges and universities that perpetuated racially discriminatory 
practices. SMITH, supra note 11, at 96. 
 120. See Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 628 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 121. See N.Y.C. Jaycees, 512 F.2d at 859. 
 122. See, e.g., Big Sky D-I College Men’s CC (2015), USA ULTIMATE, 
https://play.usaultimate.org/events/Big-Sky-D-I-College-Mens-CC-2015/FieldMap/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z9TZ-NCTC] (indicating that the tournament took place on both the 
campus of Boise State University and local municipal parks). 
 123. See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 573–74 (1974); Magill v. Avonworth 
Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328, 1333 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 124. See generally Ponce v. Basketball Fed’n of P.R., 760 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(holding in a case alleging nationality discrimination that the Basketball Federation of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Federation”) did not act with state power when 
declining to admit an American citizen based on eligibility rules). Much like USA 
Ultimate, the Federation served as a private, nonprofit sporting organization that oversaw 
and directed the play of a sport at an amateur level. See id. at 376. In the same way that 
USA Ultimate, through WFDF, is a member of an Olympic Committee and represents the 
United States on the international stage, the Federation represented Puerto Rico on the 
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Furthermore, none of the aforementioned tests brings USA 
Ultimate within the scope of state action. The nexus test fails in part 
because there is not a sufficiently close connection between USA 
Ultimate and the government. While USA Ultimate may have 
received some form of federal funding in the past, such receipt fails to 
create a close enough connection.125 In any event, USA Ultimate 
appears not to have received federal funding in recent years.126 No 
government entity is alleged to have used USA Ultimate as a proxy 
actor or encouraged USA Ultimate’s actions. The symbiotic 
relationship and joint action tests similarly fail due to a lack of 
legitimate connections between the state and USA Ultimate; the two 
simply cannot be said to have acted in concert due to the lack of a 
clear dependency or decisionmaking relationship. Additionally, 
because tournaments take place at various public facilities on an 
irregular basis,127 no long-term relationship develops between USA 
Ultimate and the government entities with which it interacts for 
tournament purposes. Finally, USA Ultimate, in functioning only as 
the governing entity of a sport, does not exercise powers traditionally 
reserved to the state. This test is interpreted even more narrowly than 
the others,128 and considering that USA Ultimate does not take on 
responsibilities as distinctly governmental as running elections for 
public officials or managing public parks, notwithstanding their use of 
them, the exclusive function test must fail as well.129 
 
Olympic and international level. See id. Despite the aesthetically meshed relationship 
between the Federation and the Puerto Rican government, however, the First Circuit 
determined that the relationship was merely symbolic and did not accord the Federation 
state authority. Id. at 378. Considering the similarities between USA Ultimate and the 
Federation, it appears that one could easily project a lack of state authority in USA 
Ultimate’s actions. 
 125. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 384 n.3 (1978) (“This Court 
has never held that the mere receipt of federal or state funds is sufficient to make the 
recipient a federal or state actor.”). 
 126. See supra note 117–18 and accompanying text. 
 127. This lack of consistency results from the bid system for tournament locations, 
whereby individual schools or groups apply to host tournaments; this system presides for 
USA Ultimate postseason tournaments as well. See Tournament Sanctioning, USA 
ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/resources/sanctioning/tournaments.aspx [https://perma.cc/
MGS3-CVMQ]. 
 128. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (noting that the question in 
this test is not whether the party performs a public function but “whether the function 
performed has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State” (quoting Jackson 
v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974))). 
 129. In assessing USA Ultimate’s potential governmental ties and the resulting 
possible implications of state action, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has 
determined that the NCAA is not a state actor, despite its considerable ties to all fifty 
state governments in the form of a substantial number of its constituent members being 
state universities. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 (1988). By extension, USA 
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Unless USA Ultimate has done or later will do something that 
creates a closer nexus between itself and state authority, claims 
undergirded by the First Amendment or other constitutional 
provisions should not succeed. The Constitution is not the only 
potential source of help for BYU CHI, however, so other sources of 
law are worth assessing. 
2.  Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states in part that “[a]ll 
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any 
place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without 
discrimination or segregation on the ground of .	.	. religion.”130 This 
portion of the broadly sweeping and landscape-changing federal civil 
rights legislation deals specifically with discrimination in places of 
public accommodation.131 The scope here differs from constitutional 
protections of the exercise of religion in that this law can encompass 
completely private acts so long as they substantially interact with 
interstate commerce.132 Courts must liberally construe Title II in 
order to fulfill the clear purpose of the Act: to eradicate 
discrimination in public places so that all citizens can have the full 
enjoyment of public facilities.133 Specifically important to BYU CHI’s 
case is the fact that the statute includes within its definition of “place 
of public accommodation” spaces such as “sports arena[s], stadium[s] 
or other place[s] of exhibition or entertainment.”134 
Because Title II explicitly encompasses sports arenas and other 
similar venues, the law appears at first blush to be a potential avenue 
for BYU CHI to pursue its claim. Additionally, because BYU CHI’s 
 
Ultimate’s tangential ties to state universities should not be considered enough to render 
its actions “state action.” While the Supreme Court has decided that one athletic 
governing body—“a statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic 
competition”—qualified as a state actor under the nexus test, USA Ultimate bears far 
fewer connections to the state than did the entity at issue in that case. Brentwood Acad. v. 
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 290–93 (2001) (observing that the 
association was largely funded by public schools, was led by public school representatives, 
operated under the state’s approval, offered benefits through the state’s public retirement 
system, and associated itself with the state in a number of other ways). 
 130. 42 U.S.C. §	2000a(a) (2012). 
 131. Id.; see also Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Dialogue and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1095, 1095 (2005) (expressing that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was “a seminal legislative accomplishment of the twentieth century”). 
 132. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 303–08 (1969) (ruling that a private recreational 
facility fell within the scope of Title II because its snack bar interacted with interstate 
commerce and the club anticipated entertaining people traveling in interstate commerce). 
 133. See id. at 306–08. 
 134. 42 U.S.C. §	2000a(b)(3) (2012). 
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coach has alluded to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in discussing this 
dispute publicly, the team appears to be aware that Title II may 
apply.135 Indeed, the particular fact pattern adds new wrinkles to 
already-addressed issues and even finds new ground for argument, 
making this conflict especially interesting to analyze under the civil 
rights legislation. 
Generally, to state an actionable claim under Title II, a party 
must allege that it  
(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) attempted to exercise 
the right to full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public 
accommodations; (3) was denied those benefits and enjoyment; 
and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated 
persons who are not members of the protected class.136  
Additionally, a Title II plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief if it can 
show a “real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged 
again.”137 
At first glance, and based solely on the above test, BYU CHI 
seems as though it could have an actionable claim. The team passes 
the first element—a showing that it is a member of a protected class—
because it effectively is a religious group.138 Then, depending on 
tournament venue, the team could pass the second element by 
showing that it attempted to participate in a tournament that 
occurred in a place of public accommodation. It should then be able 
to pass the third element by showing that it was unable to fully 
participate due to its religious beliefs. Finally, BYU CHI should pass 
the final element by showing that other teams who were not part of 
the protected religious class were able to compete for the full 
weekend. Also, proving that the team is likely to suffer the same 
harm again will not be problematic, considering the tournament 
occurs yearly and the team has suffered this same fate for many years. 
Yet the above test is not entirely straightforward as applied in 
this case. For instance, does every single college postseason 
tournament actually take place at a place of public accommodation? 
 
 135. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 136. Dunn v. Albertsons, No. 2:16-cv-02194-GMN-PAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
127815, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2017) (citing United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 
F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 137. Brooks v. Collis Foods, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (quoting 
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 1997)). Furthermore, 
a plaintiff in a Title II claim is entitled only to injunctive relief, not money damages. See 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). 
 138. 42 U.S.C. §	2000a(a) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in any place of public 
accommodation on the basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin”). 
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Due to the relative complexity of the matter at issue, several other 
factors must be analyzed to determine whether the alleged 
discrimination by USA Ultimate would be actionable under Title II. 
Those include the nexus between USA Ultimate’s actions and 
interstate commerce; whether a postseason tournament qualifies as a 
place of public accommodation; and USA Ultimate’s apparent lack of 
discriminatory intent as a precipitating factor. 
a. Interstate Commerce 
First, in order for Title II to apply, the location of the alleged 
discrimination must be involved in interstate commerce in some 
substantial way.139 That factor, which is separate from but interacts 
with the four-element test above, can be met in several ways. For 
instance, if the space offers items that have traveled in interstate 
commerce, Title II will apply.140 In the case of sporting events, the 
presence of participants who have traveled in interstate commerce 
can also satisfy Title II’s interstate commerce requirement.141 
Furthermore, substantial and regular attendance of patrons from out-
of-state can satisfy this requirement.142 As such, if an establishment or 
place of entertainment like a sports venue customarily hosts 
tournaments that feature goods, athletic teams, or patrons that have 
moved in interstate commerce, then the establishment falls within the 
scope of Title II.143 
Additionally, Title II’s application extends to the whole of a 
facility or establishment when one portion of it is determined to fall 
within Title II’s reach.144 For instance, if an establishment’s snack bar 
or lunch counter is covered under Title II because it offers goods that 
have traveled in, have interacted with, or will affect interstate 
commerce, then the entirety of the establishment becomes a place of 
public accommodation within the meaning of Title II.145 
 
 139. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1964). 
 140. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 303–08 (1969). 
 141. United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1989), 
aff’d, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990). In a sports tournament context, courts have determined 
that attendance of out-of-state teams and players at annual golf tournaments was enough 
to bring the pertinent golf courses within the ambit of Title II. See Brown v. Loudoun Golf 
& Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399, 401–02 (E.D. Va. 1983); Evans v. Laurel Links, 
Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. Va. 1966) (holding that a golf course that hosted an out-
of-state team once a year was subject to Title II). 
 142. See, e.g., Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 792 (determining that a swim club’s out-of-
state guest rate of around ten percent over two years was significant and regular enough to 
satisfy the commerce requirement). 
 143. Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 477. 
 144. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305. 
 145. Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 795; Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 476. 
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For the postseason tournaments that would be at issue in a 
lawsuit between BYU CHI and USA Ultimate, this factor is satisfied 
in every single case. At the very least, the Big Sky Conference 
encompasses colleges and universities from four states. Thus, 
whenever the Conference Championship Tournament occurs, teams 
travel interstate in order to reach the tournament. That fact satisfies 
the interstate participant analysis. Furthermore, apparel vendors or 
tournament directors often sell merchandise that likely would have 
traveled through interstate commerce. Finally, many tournaments are 
held at parks with some form of food and beverage stand. As with 
those food stands at issue in several seminal cases like United States v. 
Lansdowne Swim Club,146 a food bar at an ultimate tournament likely 
would offer food and beverages that traveled in interstate commerce. 
By extension, the designation of the food bar as a public 
accommodation would bring the entire sports complex hosting the 
ultimate tournament into Title II’s scope. Invariably, the interstate 
commerce test would be met at a college postseason ultimate 
tournament. 
b. Place of Public Accommodation 
The next issue is determining whether the postseason 
tournaments are places of public accommodation—the second of the 
four elements in the Title II test. In order to prove that the 
tournaments are places of public accommodation, BYU CHI would 
need to satisfy the “place” or “situs” requirement. Included within 
“public accommodations” are places of entertainment, which 
generally encompass establishments where the entertainment 
materializes with the direct participation in an activity or a sport.147 In 
other words, the “sports arena” and “stadium” included in the 
language of Title II serve as places of accommodation both for the 
spectators and for the participants.148 Courts have reached this 
 
 146. 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff’d, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 147. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306–08. Even under stricter articulations of the “place of 
entertainment” test, an ultimate tournament should qualify because its primary purpose is 
to provide entertainment for those participating and potentially for spectators as well. See 
Michael F. Roessler, Recent Development, We Are Not Amused: The Narrow 
Interpretation of Title II’s Place-of-Entertainment Provision in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden 
Salons, Inc., 85 N.C. L. REV. 1259, 1269–70 (2007) (discussing the “primary-purpose test” 
used in the Fourth Circuit, which requires that an establishment’s primary purpose be to 
entertain in order to be considered a place of entertainment under Title II). 
 148. Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 790–91. The Supreme Court noted that this finding 
comports with the generally accepted meaning of “entertainment” and accords with Title 
II’s aim of “remov[ing] the daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials 
of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public.” Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307–08; see 
also Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 477 (determining that plaintiffs suing for access to a whites-
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conclusion in the context of several sports, including golf149 and 
football.150 
Under the clear meaning of “place,” the tournaments should 
satisfy the situs requirement. Generally, the tournaments take place 
at either public fields—whether owned by a university or 
municipality—or private athletic fields. Either way, the tournaments 
qualify as places of entertainment because both spectators and 
competitors are invited to enter or participate, and the tournaments 
take place at venues that are explicitly included within the language 
of Title II. Thus, in terms of the plain language of the statute, the 
tournaments constitute Title II places of public accommodation.  
Other issues remain, however. Namely, because USA Ultimate 
would be the likely defendant in a Title II lawsuit, assessing how that 
organization interacts with the place of public accommodation 
requirement could be pivotal. Thus, this Comment analyzes whether 
USA Ultimate is itself a place of public accommodation and whether 
it becomes more closely tied to the situs as a lessee. 
i.  USA Ultimate: The Organization as a Place of Public 
Accommodation 
Under current case law, USA Ultimate as an organization does 
not qualify as a Title II place of public accommodation. Although the 
organization does not fall within the express statutory exception for 
“private clubs,” its similarity to other organizations that have been 
deemed not to fall within the ambit of Title II should prevent its 
application in this case. 
First, Title II explicitly places certain private establishments 
outside its reach. Specifically, Title II does not apply to private clubs 
“not in fact open to the public.”151 As a result, if an organization or 
business is determined to be a private club, then it may discriminate 
without fear of repercussion under Title II. Because the statute itself 
does not clearly define what a private club is,152 courts have identified 
several factors to evaluate in determining whether a club is private, 
including the selectivity of the organization’s membership; the 
membership’s management, ownership, or control over the club’s 
 
only golf club “[were] not limited to watching golf matches” but could “play golf on the 
defendant’s course on the same basis as white customers” (emphasis added)). 
 149. Brown v. Loudoun Golf & Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399, 402 (E.D. Va. 
1983). 
 150. United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass’n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 482–83 (E.D. La. 
1974). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. §	2000a(e) (2012). 
 152. Lansdowne, 713 F. Supp. at 796. 
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operations; the club’s history; whether nonmembers have access to or 
use the club’s facilities; the purpose of the club’s existence; whether 
the club publicly recruits or advertises for members; whether the club 
is for-profit or nonprofit; and whether the club has implemented 
formalities such as having bylaws, meetings, and membership cards.153 
For example, in an early Title II case, an Alabama YMCA 
claimed that it qualified as a private club and thus could not be forced 
to comply with the anti-discrimination law.154 The Fifth Circuit 
rejected the YMCA’s argument.155 The court observed that the 
YMCA’s membership policies were too unselective; it lacked 
attributes of member ownership associated with private clubs; it 
generated substantial revenue from public agencies; it provided many 
recreational programs to the general public; and it operated as a 
quasi-public agency.156 Assessing these aggregate factors, the court 
determined that the YMCA was not a private club and was thus 
subject to Title II as a place of public accommodation.157 
Similarly, USA Ultimate should not qualify as a private club. 
First, the organization is not selective in its membership. It actively 
solicits members—indeed, it exists to grow the sport by recruiting 
members—and the threshold for membership is signing up and paying 
to be a member.158 Although USA Ultimate members provide 
feedback,159 and most of the staff are members,160 there is a clear and 
narrow organizational leadership structure that does not incorporate 
the opinions of its many individual members.161 The organization is a 
nonprofit corporation;162 it has established various corporate features 
 
 153. Id. at 796–97. 
 154. Smith v. YMCA of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634, 642 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 155. Id. at 648–49. 
 156. Id. at 642, 648–49. 
 157. Id. at 649. 
 158. See Membership Overview, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
membership/ [https://perma.cc/VN8V-FKUF]. 
 159. See Members’ Impact, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
membershipimpact/ [https://perma.cc/85ZJ-HZK9] (stating that “members’ .	.	. feedback 
.	.	.	[is] important to USA Ultimate”). 
 160. See Contact Us: USA Ultimate Headquarters Staff, USA ULTIMATE, 
https://www.usaultimate.org/about/contact_us/hq_staff.aspx#leej [https://perma.cc/52ED-
BBKM] (providing the biographies of staff members, many of whom previously played the 
sport and were otherwise associated with USA Ultimate). 
 161. See Board of Directors, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
about/contact_us/board_of_directors.aspx [https://perma.cc/G42E-5HM6]; Contact Us: 
USA Ultimate Headquarters Staff, supra note 160. 
 162. About, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/about_us/ [https://perma.cc/
K32A-U6XA]. 
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like bylaws;163 and members wield membership cards.164 Although 
some facts—like the membership cards—push lightly in favor of 
deeming USA Ultimate a private club, the organization should not be 
so considered. USA Ultimate, similar to the YMCA in Smith v. 
YMCA of Montgomery, Inc.,165 is a large organization that solicits and 
welcomes all types of members and has low hurdles for admission. By 
almost any measure, USA Ultimate is not a private club and is 
therefore not exempt from Title II for that particular reason. 
While USA Ultimate most likely is not exempt as a private club, 
other features of the organization arguably take the organization 
outside the scope of Title II. Recent litigation dealing with the Boy 
Scouts of America’s (“BSA”) refusal to allow prospective boy scouts 
or adult scout leaders to join the organization due to internal policies 
indicates that an organization’s lack of concrete association to 
particular locations can bring the organization outside the scope of 
Title II. 
In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America,166 for instance, a son and 
father sued the BSA and a local BSA council under Title II for 
admission to a troop after they were refused entry due to their 
atheism.167 The plaintiffs contended that the BSA constituted a place 
of public accommodation because the active, fun, and recreational 
nature of the organization rendered it a place of entertainment.168 The 
BSA argued that it was not a “place” subject to Title II but merely an 
organization that facilitated scouting activities.169 Early in its analysis, 
the court noted that the BSA is a membership organization whose 
activities did not center around a specific facility or place and that 
“membership in [the BSA] does not provide access to a particular 
facility.”170 It then moved on to determine whether “place” should be 
construed in its literal connotation as a “physical site” or if this was 
merely a term of convenience that would allow for inclusion of 
accommodations that do not have a specific location or facility.171 It 
 
 163. See generally USA Ultimate Bylaws, USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/
bylaws/ [https://perma.cc/WL8N-CY2R] (providing the USA Ultimate bylaws). 
 164. USA ULTIMATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2013), https://www.usaultimate.org/
assets/1/Page/USA%20Ultimate%20Annual%20Report%202013_FINAL_lowres.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F8U2-GQ3M] (“All members receive a membership card .	.	.	.”). 
 165. 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 166. 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff’d, 933 F. 2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 167. Id. at 1512. The BSA requires its members to “subscribe to a duty to God.” Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1512–13. 
 170. Id. at 1521. 
 171. Id. at 1522. 
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noted that this question was novel in the Title II context but that it 
had been addressed in similarly worded state laws.172 
Ultimately, the Welsh court declined to extend “place” status to 
the BSA within the context of Title II because the BSA lacked the 
commensurate ties to a particular facility of the kind contemplated in 
Title II.173 In its analysis, the court noted a range of interpretations of 
the term “place,” spanning from strict adherence to its physical 
connotation to a conclusion that “a membership organization need 
not be a ‘place’ in order to come within the reach of a statute like 
Title II, so long as its activities center upon an identifiable 
location.”174 The Welsh court considered “place” to be inextricably 
tied to “the concept of a physical site” under Title II.175 The court 
pointed to membership organizations, like youth sports associations, 
that would fall within the scope of Title II, but only in the context of 
the organization owning its own facilities and discriminatorily 
refusing entry to particular protected parties.176 In contrast, the BSA 
“lack[ed] a connection to a particular site or facility” and thus failed 
to qualify as a “place” under Title II.177 In the end, the court 
concluded that, “[i]n order to qualify as a ‘place of public 
accommodation’ within the scope of Title II, an establishment must 
have a substantial connection to a concrete facility or location,” which 
means that membership organizations that “do not operate from or 
supply access to a particular facility or location” are not within the 
scope of Title II.178 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.179 
 
 172. Id. at 1522–23. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1528; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656–57 (2000) 
(observing that in some states, the definition of “public accommodation” had extended 
from “clearly commercial entities” to “membership organizations such as the Boy 
Scouts”); Brounstein v. Am. Cat Fanciers Ass’n, 839 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D.N.J. 1993) 
(observing that the New Jersey state anti-discrimination law did not require “place” to be 
a fixed location). 
 175. Welsh, 787 F. Supp. at 1530. 
 176. Id. at 1531. 
 177. Id. at 1538. The court also noted that, although the BSA has administrative offices 
and meets at certain sponsored locations like churches and schools, access to the physical 
locations was not at issue; membership to the organization was at issue. Id. at 1538–39. 
Furthermore, the court feared the constitutional implications of considering organizations 
with any semblance of a physical meeting point to be open to everyone under Title II. Id. 
at 1539. 
 178. Id. at 1541. Also, “where the benefits of membership in an organization flow 
primarily, if not exclusively, from the interpersonal association among the people who 
belong to the organization rather than the enjoyment of the physical accoutrements of a 
particular facility,” then Title II does not reach the organization itself. Id. at 1540. 
 179. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1268 (7th Cir. 1993). Welsh has not 
received universal approbation. Compare Edward Bigham, Recent Decision, Civil 
Rights—Seventh Circuit Permits Boy Scouts of America to Exclude Atheist, 67 TEMP. L. 
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Given the Welsh court’s analysis, USA Ultimate compares 
favorably with the BSA. USA Ultimate is an organization that 
facilitates recreational activities across the United States. Due to the 
nature of how its tournaments are held, however, its spatial ties are 
fluid. Individual teams or groups apply to host tournaments, and USA 
Ultimate merely sanctions them.180 Unlike the sports leagues that 
actually own the spaces at issue in some Title II cases,181 or the 
YMCA discussed above,182 USA Ultimate does not actually own the 
spaces at which most of its activities are held.183 Indeed, in this regard, 
USA Ultimate and the BSA are quite similar. The analogy between 
the two organizations in this legal context is limited, of course, by the 
type of controversy at hand in each case. In Welsh, the issue is 
membership in the organization, whereas in the present conflict, the 
issue is BYU CHI’s ability to compete meaningfully in USA 
Ultimate’s college postseason. BYU CHI and its players are members 
of USA Ultimate, so the access to the organization is not at issue. In 
terms of Title II, however, it is important to note that the location, 
not the organization itself, is the linchpin for a lawsuit because being 
able to sue USA Ultimate as a place of public accommodation could 
grant BYU CHI great latitude to choose a forum for its lawsuit. 
ii.  Lessee Issue 
Lastly, there is another spatial issue: USA Ultimate does not 
directly own or operate the facilities where tournaments take place. 
As such, the relationship between USA Ultimate as the allegedly 
discriminatory party and the locations and establishments of the 
tournaments where the alleged discrimination occurs is tenuous and 
creates ambiguity for Title II application. This issue is novel in the 
context of Title II. Most cases have dealt with businesses or entities 
 
REV. 1333, 1345–49 (1994) (criticizing the courts’ conclusions that the BSA does not 
qualify as a place of public accommodation), with Patrick J. Poff, Case Note, Welsh v. Boy 
Scouts of America: Defining the Scope of a “Place of Public Accommodation” Under Title 
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1137, 1141–44 (1994) (commending 
the Welsh court’s conclusions of law). 
 180. See Tournament Sanctioning, supra note 127. 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass’n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 477 (E.D. 
La. 1974). 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 154–57. 
 183. Since it does not have facilities to offer, USA Ultimate relies on its “sanctioning 
program .	.	. to encourage and support the growth of Ultimate at all levels” by facilitating 
opportunities for players and legitimizing playing the sport. USA Ultimate Sanctioning, 
USA ULTIMATE, https://www.usaultimate.org/resources/sanctioning/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/NZ9C-Q62M]. 
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operating in a static location, such as a motel.184 In this case, however, 
USA Ultimate is not the owner of particular fields at which the 
tournaments occur. Instead, individual schools or teams apply to host 
the tournament, and USA Ultimate simply facilitates the tournament 
at that location.185 The issue becomes, then, whether the ephemeral 
nature of the tournament locations from year to year prevents the site 
from falling within the scope of Title II. 
One particularly relevant example for this issue is Wesley v. City 
of Savannah,186 which involved a private organization’s annual use of 
a municipal golf course for a local golf tournament.187 The private golf 
association that organized the tournament limited its membership and 
special event eligibility to Caucasians.188 The organization owned no 
golf course of its own and primarily used public courses for its 
events.189 Black golfers who were refused entry to the tournament 
sued under Title II, claiming that the private club’s use of a municipal 
golf course implicated the government enough to bring the 
tournament within Title II’s reach.190 While the private organization 
conceded that the city’s golf course was a place of public 
accommodation, it argued that it was merely a third-party customer 
using the course and that Title II should not reach into such lessee 
relationships.191 The court determined that “[s]tate action may take 
the form of allowing private organizations to use public facilities” and 
that, while the city was not actively subsidizing the club’s use of its 
golf course, the mere leasing of the course constituted enough 
governmental action to qualify as state involvement sufficient to 
implicate Title II.192 Factors such as the clear association with the city 
government, the annual use of public resources by the private 
organization, and the coining of the tournament as the “City Amateur 
Championship” helped lead the court to its determination.193 
Additionally, analogous cases involving the NCAA have 
occurred in a similar public accommodations context: Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Since Title II of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title III of the ADA have 
 
 184. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 
(1964) (forcing a motel to open up to black patrons). 
 185. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 186. 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga. 1969). 
 187. Id. at 699. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 702–03. 
 190. Id. at 700. 
 191. Id. at 701–02. 
 192. Id. at 702. 
 193. Id. at 702–03. 
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comparable public accommodations provisions, decisions rendered 
under either statute can provide instructive analysis for the other.194 
In those cases, courts recognized the difference between analyzing 
“organizations as organizations” in the public accommodations 
context and organizations “as the operators of facilities that might, in 
turn be considered places of public accommodation.”195 In those 
cases, courts analyzed whether the NCAA had close enough 
connections with particular facilities to be deemed, as an 
organization, a place of public accommodation.196 For example, in 
Ganden v. NCAA,197 the court, in considering a motion for 
preliminary injunction, found that the plaintiff had a “reasonable 
likelihood of demonstrating” that the NCAA qualified as a place of 
public accommodation because it exerted a certain amount of control 
over and was closely connected to the athletic facilities of its member 
institutions.198 That analysis relied on whether the organization was 
affiliated with a particular facility and whether one needed to be a 
member of or affiliated with the organization in order to use that 
facility.199 The court found that it was reasonably likely that the 
NCAA operated a university’s facilities and was sufficiently closely 
connected to qualify as a place of public accommodation.200 
Much like the golf organization in Wesley, USA Ultimate does 
not own the athletic venues, arenas, and fields where its tournaments 
take place. This attenuated connection to the ultimate tournament 
facilities contrasts USA Ultimate against the NCAA, which has 
member institutions and bears a much closer relationship to the 
physical locations that act as places of public accommodation. And 
moving further away from the Wesley golf club example, USA 
Ultimate does not even directly lease out space for most of the 
postseason tournaments potentially at issue in this particular conflict. 
Instead, individual teams or groups apply to host, and these parties 
find the particular tournament sites. USA Ultimate merely facilitates 
the tournaments. Wesley’s application is therefore suspect, and the 
 
 194. See Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998). Borrowing from 
the ADA for this analysis is limited to assessing whether leasing a certain space would 
qualify an organization as a place of public accommodation. The comparison does not 
extend to evaluating whether discrimination has occurred in a place of public 
accommodation. 
 195. See, e.g., id.  
 196. See, e.g., id. at 1119, 1121. 
 197. No. 96 C 6953, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 198. Id. at *29–30. 
 199. Id. at *33–34. 
 200. Id. at *34; see also Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1121 (finding that the NCAA “operates 
a place of public accommodation” in part because of “[t]he significant degree of control 
that [it] exerts over the athletic facilities of its member institutions”). 
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NCAA cases do not provide strong purchase. The Wesley court, 
however, clearly determined that third parties who lease and operate 
places of public accommodation may not discriminate in a manner 
that violates Title II. Arguably, those who run USA Ultimate 
postseason tournaments are doing so either under the auspices of 
USA Ultimate or are USA Ultimate’s agents in facilitating the 
postseason. Although there is a layer of separation that was not 
present in Wesley, courts should be able to find that USA Ultimate is 
implicated enough in the public accommodation spaces to bring them 
in as a party to a lawsuit. Due to the nebulous nature of the law on 
this point, along with USA Ultimate’s fluid and sporadic relationship 
with the various tournament locations from year to year, both sides 
could have ample room to argue their cases. 
c. Intent 
The final and certainly most fatal issue is one of intent. In order 
for Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to apply, a defendant must 
have intentionally discriminated against a party in a protected class.201 
Actions that incidentally affect a particular religious group generally 
do not fall within the scope of Title II.202 If an establishment or 
organization “has set up facially neutral regulations governing the 
provision of its services, with no indication of discriminatory motive 
or intent,” then there is no claim under Title II.203 Furthermore, if the 
organization establishes “a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
justification” for its policy, then it has asserted enough to stave off a 
Title II claim.204 
 
 201. Generally, Title II claims must “allege intentional discrimination.” Jalal v. Lucille 
Roberts Health Clubs Inc., 254 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting James v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d 297, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)), vacated as moot, No. 17-1936, 
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18798 (2d Cir. 2017). Additionally, Title II claims must “plead 
‘facts which demonstrate discriminatory intent’ .	.	.	.” Id. (quoting Coward v. Town & Vill. 
of Harrison, 665 F. Supp. 2d 281, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). Furthermore, Title II does not 
necessarily target private actions that have unintended discriminatory effects. See id. 
“[I]ntent to discriminate [as] the animating element of a Title II claim” is necessary “given 
the fact that religious beliefs are subjective and personal, [and] practically any rule created 
by a public accommodation could adversely affect an individual or one group of people.” 
Id. at 608; see also Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184–85 (W.D. Wash. 
2002) (determining that, for “allegations of religious discrimination, intent must be an 
element of the claim,” and commenting that “[v]irtually any restriction or regulation 
imposed by a public accommodation could impinge on a person’s religious beliefs .	.	. 
whether it be by conducting business only on Sundays, by failing to keep a Kosher kitchen, 
[or] by failing to include fish on the menu during Lent”). 
 202. See Akiyama, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1184–85. 
 203. Id. at 1187. 
 204. Id. 
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Boyle v. Jerome Country Club,205 for instance, dealt with a fact 
pattern similar to the one present in the USA Ultimate conflict. The 
defendant country club hosted golf tournaments that took place 
exclusively on weekends.206 The plaintiff, a Mormon, was unable to 
play in the tournaments due to his religious abstention of playing on 
Sundays.207 After the defendant refused to make scheduling 
accommodations, the plaintiff sued under Title II, claiming that the 
tournament format and the defendant’s refusal to change it 
constituted religious discrimination.208 The plaintiff also asserted that 
the defendant had a duty to accommodate his religious beliefs.209 
The court preliminarily observed that the plaintiff’s religious 
beliefs were sincere,210 the defendant had never refused to permit the 
plaintiff entry to the course or tournament,211 the golf course was in 
fact a public accommodation,212 other Mormon members had played 
in the tournament,213 and no Mormon had requested a change in the 
schedule in the past.214 Additionally, the court paid particular 
attention to the defendant’s stated reasons for refusing to change the 
tournament schedule. These included a desire to avoid negatively 
affecting other players; “open[ing] the door to allow every participant 
in the tournament to make special requests”; and various staffing, 
logistical, and economic issues that would accompany such an 
accommodation.215 
Because the parties to the case agreed that the golf course was a 
public accommodation, the court proceeded to analyze “legal issues 
on which precious little precedent exists,” including who bears the 
burden of proof and the level of scienter required in Title II cases.216 
Following authority from the Seventh Circuit, the court used a 
burden-shifting analysis.217 Under that test, a “[p]laintiff has the initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of improper discrimination,” 
which can be met with minimal proof.218 If a plaintiff establishes a 
 
 205. 883 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Idaho 1995). 
 206. Id. at 1424. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 1425. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1429. 
 213. Id. at 1429–30. 
 214. Id. at 1430. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1429. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (citing Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
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prima facie case, then the court presumes unlawful discrimination.219 
“The burden then shifts to the defendant ‘who must offer evidence 
that the adverse action was taken for other than impermissibly 
discriminatory reasons.’”220 If a defendant gives proof of “legitimate 
reasons” for its action, then “the presumptions created by the prima 
facie case” in favor of a plaintiff “disappear.”221 Finally, the burden 
shifts back to a plaintiff, who must show that the defendant’s 
proffered reasons are mere “pretext for another motive which is 
discriminatory.”222 
In this case, the court found that the plaintiff established a prima 
facie case because he provided sufficient evidence that the 
tournament’s Sunday games prevented him from fully and equally 
enjoying the public accommodation’s benefits.223 The burden then 
shifted to the defendant, which provided evidence that Mormons had 
played in the tournament in the past and that allowing this 
accommodation to the schedule would create logistical and financial 
burdens on the defendant.224 The court determined that the defendant 
“presented substantial evidence that it has legitimate business 
reasons, completely unrelated to religious considerations, for 
scheduling its final round of play on Sunday.”225 Finally, the plaintiff 
had an opportunity to show that the defendant’s reasons were 
pretextual.226 While the plaintiff attempted to show that altering the 
schedule would not create a great burden for the defendant or undue 
benefit for the plaintiff, he failed to do what the court asked: to show 
that the defendant’s given reason for not changing its schedule was 
pretextual.227 The plaintiff thus failed to carry his burden, and the 
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.228 
Ultimately the defendant’s clear and substantial evidence of its 
business reasons for refusing to accommodate the plaintiff—which 
were unrelated to religious considerations—and a lack of evidence 
that the club showed any animus towards the plaintiff on religious 
grounds convinced the court to grant the defendant summary 
judgment on the Title II claim.229 Essentially, the court held that, if a 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. (quoting Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889). 
 221. Id. (quoting Wallis, 26 F.3d at 892). 
 222. Id. (quoting Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1429–30. 
 225. Id. at 1430. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1430–31. 
 228. Id. at 1431–33. 
 229. Id. at 1430–33. 
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defendant has clear and legitimate business or operational reasons for 
refusing to accommodate, and there is no clear pretextual religious 
discrimination, then the defendant is not obligated to accommodate 
religious preferences for incidentally discriminatory effects of the 
organization’s policy.230 
Here, USA Ultimate clearly did not establish the weekend 
tournament format to intentionally discriminate against BYU CHI 
for its adherence to a Sunday-play prohibition. Instead, the weekend 
tournament format developed over many years by necessity. Ultimate 
is a sport that is still largely played on the amateur level, and 
weekends are the most efficient time to schedule the necessary 
number of games for a full tournament and to have enough games for 
college rankings. Unlike many NCAA athletes, those who play 
ultimate often are unable to make multiple trips to play games or to 
miss classes. The weekend tournament is the best way to meet the 
various needs of most student-athletes, and changing the schedule to 
abandon Sunday play would create great inconveniences for the vast 
majority of players. Additionally, making concessions here means 
that USA Ultimate could lead to having to make similar concessions 
for schools that have prohibitions on playing on other days. Although 
Title II covers places of public accommodation, it does not require a 
sports organization to accommodate members of protected classes by 
changing schedules if its refusal is not intentionally discriminatory and 
it has legitimate business, logistical, or other reasons to refuse. 
Since BYU CHI does not have options for recourse under the 
Constitution and federal statutory law, it will need to succeed in 
showing that USA Ultimate has unlawfully discriminated against 
BYU CHI under state anti-discrimination laws by refusing to 
accommodate the team’s scheduling needs.  
3.  State Options 
Beyond the realm of federal law, individual states have 
implemented their own anti-discrimination legislation, and 
prohibitions on religious discrimination in places of public 
accommodation are universally present.231 While federal law sets a de 
 
 230. Id. at 1432. 
 231. See, e.g., Michelle L. Carusone, Comment, Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and 
Monmouth Council: New Jersey’s Attempt to Define Places of Public Accommodation and 
Remedy the “Cancer of Discrimination,” 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 823, 827 n.22 (2000) (listing 
the state anti-discrimination statutes and noting that they all prohibit religious 
discrimination). For this section’s state statutory analysis, this Comment will assume that 
ultimate tournaments qualify as places of public accommodation because the statutes 
broadly define the term “public accommodation.” See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-2-
101(20)(a) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 2019 sess.) (defining “public 
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facto minimum standard of anti-discrimination for this type of 
legislation,232 states can opt to provide further protections and 
establish more rigid policies against discrimination.233 As such, state 
laws may provide a party that allegedly has suffered from 
discrimination further opportunity to seek redress. 
Although BYU CHI hopes to resolve this conflict in a manner 
that allows them to attend the National Championship Tournament, 
which could be located in any given state in any given season, a state 
law claim likely would need to be brought where the initial harm 
occurred. In this case, because the team would effectively be 
penalized for forfeiting its Sunday games in the first round of the 
postseason, the harm would have to occur at the conference 
championships, which BYU CHI would play in Montana, 
Washington, Utah, or Idaho. As such, this section will review state 
anti-discrimination laws in these states.234 
As a preliminary matter, of the states discussed below, Montana, 
Washington, and Idaho have statutorily established administrative 
commissions that adjudicate complaints alleging discrimination.235 In 
some cases, the complaints must first be brought to the applicable 
administrative agency before the parties can resort to the state’s 
judiciary.236 In those states, courts do not have jurisdiction over these 
cases until all remedies are exhausted at the administrative level.237 
 
accommodation” as “a place that caters or offers its services, goods, or facilities to the 
general public subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and 
applicable to all persons” and providing an explicitly noncomprehensive list of examples 
of places of public accommodation). 
 232. This is a de facto minimum standard because federal law is plenary. See Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974).  
 233. States can generally provide laws that are more protective than federal laws. See, 
e.g., Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1423–24 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding a California maritime overtime pay law more generous than applicable federal 
statutes). 
 234. Alberta, also a geopolitical unit that is included in the Big Sky Conference, will be 
ignored for the purposes of this analysis because it is a Canadian province that likely will 
not serve as a viable venue for BYU CHI. 
 235. See IDAHO CODE §	67-5903 (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) 
(establishing the Idaho commission on human rights); MONT. CODE ANN. §	2-15-1706 
(Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 2019 sess.) (creating the state’s commission 
for human rights); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §	49.60.050 (Westlaw through Chapter 9 of 
2019 Reg. Sess.) (creating the Washington state human rights commission). Plaintiffs in 
Utah, on the other hand, can resort to the state’s court system straightaway. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. §	13-7-4(3) (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.) (establishing that anyone 
who is discriminated against “shall have a civil action for damages and any other remedy 
available in law or equity against any person who” discriminates against him). 
 236. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-2-512 (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 
2019 sess.). 
 237. See, e.g., Jones v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 2007 MT 82, ¶	39, 337 Mont. 1, 155 P.3d 1247 
(ruling that the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to file a 
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Some states, though, allow for one to choose whether to pursue the 
administrative route or the judicial route.238 
a. Montana 
Under the Montana Human Rights Act (the “MHRA”),  
it is .	.	. unlawful .	.	. for the owner, lessee, manager, agent, or 
employee of a public accommodation: 
(a) to refuse, withhold from, or deny to a person any of its 
services, goods, facilities, advantages, or privileges because of 
.	.	. creed [or] religion .	.	.	; 
(b) to publish, circulate, issue, display, post, or mail a written or 
printed communication, notice, or advertisement which states 
or implies that any of the services, goods, facilities, advantages, 
or privileges of the public accommodation will be refused, 
withheld from, or denied to a person of a certain .	.	. creed [or] 
religion .	.	.	.239 
The MHRA provides a reasonableness exception, however, that 
allows such proprietors to distinguish persons “on reasonable 
grounds.”240 
Before plaintiffs241 can resort to the court system, they must first 
bring their complaint to the Montana Human Rights Commission 
(“Montana Commission”).242 This administrative body has the power 
to enjoin a party from future discriminatory practices, and it has the 
discretion to award reasonable monetary damages.243 After the 
 
complaint with the Montana Human Rights Commission precluded the plaintiff from 
bringing a viable claim in the trial court). 
 238. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §	49.60.020 (Westlaw through Chapter 9 of 
2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 239. MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-2-304(1) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 
2019 sess.). 
 240. Id. No cases have construed “reasonable grounds” in the context of public 
accommodations discrimination. 
 241. Under the MHRA, a plaintiff must distinguish herself as an “aggrieved party,” or 
“someone ‘who can demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest, as distinguished 
from a general interest, and who has been or is likely to be specially and injuriously 
affected’ by a violation of the Act.” Baxter Homeowners Ass’n v. Angel, 2013 MT 83, 
¶	16, 369 Mont. 398, 298 P.3d 1145 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-2-101(2) (Westlaw 
through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 2019 sess.)). 
 242. MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-2-205 (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 2019 
sess.); id. §	49-2-501. 
 243. Id. §	49-2-506(1); see also Vainio v. Brookshire, 852 P.2d 596, 601 (Mont. 1993) 
(determining that the Montana Commission may award reasonable damages). 
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Montana Commission has issued a decision, the losing party may 
commence a civil action in trial court.244 
Additionally, the Montana Commission has the power to “adopt 
procedural and substantive rules necessary to implement the 
commission’s responsibilities” under the MHRA.245 Using this 
authority, the Montana Commission has adopted several substantive 
rules to guide its adjudication of claims of discrimination. For 
instance, the Montana Commission has established that it will 
construe the MHRA “liberally .	.	. with a view to effect [its] objects 
and to promote justice.”246 The same rule, however, allows the 
Montana Commission to decline finding discrimination where “strict 
adherence” to its rule of construing the statute liberally “would cause 
undue hardship or create a substantial injustice to a party.”247 
Furthermore, the Montana Commission has adopted rules 
specific to discrimination in places of public accommodation. For 
instance, it has established that public accommodation discrimination 
may include “imposing or applying qualification standards .	.	. that 
screen out or tend to screen out a person or persons who are 
members of a protected class unless the .	.	. selection criteria can be 
shown to be necessary” for the place of public accommodation.248 The 
Montana Commission has also created rules allowing plaintiffs to 
prove discrimination under either of two tests: (1) the disparate 
treatment test249 or (2) the disparate impact test.250 
Under the disparate treatment test, a plaintiff must first establish 
a prima facie case with evidence supporting an inference that the 
 
 244. MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-2-512(3) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 
2019 sess.); see also Griffith v. Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 MT 245, ¶¶	36–39, 358 Mont. 
193, 244 P.3d 321 (holding that a party may take a discrimination case to district court for 
a trial on the merits once the Montana Commission has reached a decision). 
 245. MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-2-204(1) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 
2019 sess.). 
 246. MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.104(2) (Westlaw through Issue 5 of 2019 Mont. Admin. 
Register). The rule further states that “[a] principle objective of the [MHRA] is to assure 
that there will be no discrimination in certain areas of the lives of Montana citizens, except 
under the most limited of circumstances.” Id. Indeed, this administrative rule tracks with 
the MHRA itself, which establishes a broad policy against discrimination in places of 
public accommodation. MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-1-102(1) (Westlaw through chapters 
effective, Apr. 3, 2019 sess.) (establishing a “right to be free from discrimination because 
of .	.	. religion,” which includes “the right to the full enjoyment of any” places of public 
accommodation); see also Edwards v. Cascade Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2009 MT 451, ¶	62, 354 
Mont. 307, 223 P.3d 893 (asserting that the MHRA establishes a state “non-discrimination 
policy”). 
 247. MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.104(6) (Westlaw through Issue 5 of 2019 Mont. Admin. 
Register). 
 248. Id. R. 24.9.609(2)(a). 
 249. Id. R. 24.9.610. 
 250. Id. R. 24.9.612. 
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allegedly discriminating party considered a plaintiff’s membership in 
a protected class when engaging in its allegedly discriminatory act.251 
In order to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff generally must 
show that: (1) it is a member of a protected class, (2) it sought an 
opportunity that the defendant made available, and (3) it was denied 
the opportunity under “circumstances raising a reasonable inference 
that [a plaintiff] was treated differently because of membership in a 
protected class.”252 If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie 
case of unlawful discrimination, then the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant who “must produce evidence of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.”253 If a defendant 
produces such evidence, then a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the 
reason offered by the [defendant] is a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination,” for instance, by showing that the defendant’s “acts 
were more likely based on an unlawful motive” or that the 
defendant’s explanation is not believable.254 
Under the disparate treatment test, BYU CHI may be able to 
establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. The team can 
easily show that it is a member of a protected class and that it sought 
an opportunity that USA Ultimate made available to it. While the 
third prong might present some interpretive difficulties,255 the 
Montana Commission’s policy of construing the statutory language 
and rules broadly could help BYU CHI establish a prima facie case. 
At that point, USA Ultimate has the opportunity to rebut by offering 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to change its 
tournament schedule. The argument is straightforward: the 
 
 251. Id. R. 24.9.610(2). 
 252. Id. R. 24.9.610(2)(a). 
 253. Id. R. 24.9.610(3). 
 254. Id. R. 24.9.610(4). Furthermore, if the plaintiff “establishe[s] a prima facie case 
with direct evidence of unlawful discrimination,” then the defendant “must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that an unlawful motive played no role in the challenged 
action or that the direct evidence of discrimination is not credible and is unworthy of 
belief.” Id. R. 24.9.610(5). 
 255. To some extent, that third prong appears to be satisfied—BYU CHI does not 
have the opportunity to advance in the postseason like most other teams because the 
tournament format requires competition on the team’s religious day of rest. Such a wide 
construction of that rule, however, may misconstrue the rule’s intent. After all, the 
requirement that the plaintiff must raise a reasonable inference of discrimination because 
of disparate treatment based on membership in a protected class strongly implies that the 
defendant’s reason for distinguishing must be focused on the plaintiff’s membership in the 
protected class. Here, USA Ultimate does not appear to be distinguishing because BYU 
CHI is a team of Mormons. Instead, USA Ultimate is distinguishing because BYU CHI 
does not play on Sundays when postseason tournaments’ qualifying games occur. That 
BYU CHI does not play on Sundays because it adheres to rules stemming from its 
membership in a protected class may or may not be a close enough link to USA Ultimate’s 
reason for distinguishing to satisfy the third prong of the prima facie test. 
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tournaments have always operated this way in order to accommodate 
college-athletes’ schedules and to fit in the appropriate number of 
games. BYU CHI would then have to show that USA Ultimate’s 
reason is simply pretext for unlawful discrimination, which is an 
implausible argument given that the sport’s long tradition of weekend 
tournaments was ingrained well before BYU CHI became a 
nationally relevant team. 
The Montana Commission has also adopted the disparate impact 
test, which allows a plaintiff to prove discrimination by showing that a 
defendant’s actions adversely affected that plaintiff’s protected 
class.256 As with the disparate treatment test, the disparate impact test 
requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of unlawful 
discrimination.257 To establish a prima facie case under this test, the 
plaintiff must prove “that one or more identified practices or policies 
of [a defendant] have a significant or substantial adverse effect on the 
charging party’s protected class.”258 Under this test, the plaintiff does 
not need to provide evidence of the defendant’s intent to 
discriminate.259 If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie 
case of unlawful discrimination, then the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant, who “must produce evidence of a legitimate business 
justification for the challenged practices or policies.”260 If the 
defendant shows such a legitimate business justification for the 
allegedly discriminatory practices or policies, then the plaintiff “must 
prove that the articulated justification .	.	. is a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination.”261 The plaintiff can prove this pretext “directly with 
evidence that an unlawful motive more likely motivated the 
respondent, or indirectly” by showing that the defendant’s 
justification is not believable or that “there are other practices or 
policies available which are equally effective in serving the legitimate 
business interests of the [defendant] which do not have similar 
discriminatory effects upon members of a protected class.”262 
 
 256. Id. R. 24.9.612(1). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. R. 24.9.612(2). 
 260. Id. R. 24.9.612(3). 
 261. Id. R. 24.9.612(4). 
 262. Id. The Montana Commission has also passed a rule addressing “mixed motive” 
cases, in which the plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and the defendant proves that 
it would have taken the same action “in the absence of the [allegedly] unlawful 
discrimination.” Id. R. 24.9.611(1). In such a case, the Montana Commission has limited its 
authority to simply ordering the defendant “to refrain from the discriminatory conduct 
and [possibly] impose other conditions to minimize future violations.” Id. The Montana 
Commission will not reward money damages in such a case. Id. Because the plaintiff still 
must prove discrimination in this scenario, this Comment will focus its analysis on the 
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Additionally, BYU CHI likely would not obtain a favorable 
result under the disparate impact test. The team would easily 
establish a prima facie case by showing that USA Ultimate’s 
postseason tournament format and rules substantially and adversely 
affect the team’s ability to take full advantage of a place of public 
accommodation. BYU CHI would not have to show any intent from 
USA Ultimate to establish its prima facie case. It simply needs to 
show that it is adversely affected. As with the disparate treatment 
test, the burden would then shift to USA Ultimate, which ultimately 
should prove fatal for BYU CHI. USA Ultimate would need to show 
a legitimate business justification for its policy of having tournaments 
on weekends. As in the disparate treatment test, USA Ultimate 
should be able to establish a legitimate business interest by showing 
that it aims to increase tournament attendance and participation in 
the sport by holding tournaments on weekends when most students 
are able to attend. Again, BYU CHI would then have to show that 
USA Ultimate’s justification is unbelievable pretext, which it will not 
be able to do.  
To date, no litigation has dealt with discriminatory practices on 
religious grounds under the MHRA. A few other claims have been 
brought under the statute, though, and they lay some helpful 
groundwork. For instance, a party alleging discrimination may 
succeed by providing even just one example of discrimination under 
the MHRA.263 Overall, however, the MHRA has been the subject of 
little litigation as compared to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Thus, the dearth of case law on this issue necessitates further analysis 
of the MHRA and the Montana Commission’s rules. 
The statute establishes that denying a protected party access to 
the advantages or privileges of a place of public accommodation 
because of that party’s religion is unlawful discrimination.264 
Furthermore, the statute allows an exception for where the allegedly 
discriminatory party has distinguished the member or members of the 
protected class “on reasonable grounds.”265 Even without the 
reasonable grounds exception, BYU CHI’s claim would appear to be 
on shaky ground. After all, USA Ultimate has not disallowed the 
team to participate in the postseason because of its religious 
 
disparate treatment and disparate impact tests, which both address proving discrimination 
in the first place. 
 263. Blackfeet Opportunities, Inc. v. Cattin’s Rest., No. BDV-98-767, 1999 Mont. Dist. 
LEXIS 216, at *5 (D. Mont. Mar. 22, 1999). 
 264. MONT. CODE ANN. §	49-2-304(1) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Apr. 3, 
2019 sess.). 
 265. Id. 
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convictions. In fact, USA Ultimate allows BYU CHI to participate in 
conferences, and the team has done so in the past few years.266  
Thus, BYU CHI would need to convince a fact finder that USA 
Ultimate commits unlawful discrimination not by blocking the team 
from playing in the postseason but by refusing to change a 
tournament format that prevents BYU CHI from taking full 
advantage of the public accommodation. That argument, while 
plausible, stretches the statute’s intent because USA Ultimate is not 
preventing BYU CHI from accessing the public accommodation’s 
physical space. Also, a fact finder may not decide that this scheduling 
issue sufficiently denies the team access to the advantages of the 
tournament. Finally, the reasonable grounds exception appears to 
allow USA Ultimate the opportunity to show that its allegedly 
discriminatory acts result from the schedule that it has used for 
tournaments for decades and that this schedule works well with 
student-athletes’ academic schedules. While the lack of relevant case 
law leaves that interpretation open, USA Ultimate appears to be able 
to establish the statutorily requisite reasonable grounds for its refusal 
to accommodate. 
Since BYU CHI must first bring their claim before the Montana 
Commission, it is important to analyze their claim under the 
commission’s rules in addition to carrying out a pure statutory 
analysis. First, the commission’s policy of construing the MHRA 
liberally tends to benefit BYU CHI. The commission, however, has 
also established a rule similar to the statutory reasonable grounds rule 
by determining that it will avoid causing undue hardship to a party, 
which favors USA Ultimate. Thus, while the Montana Commission’s 
general policy to read the statutory language and rules broadly to 
prevent discrimination favors BYU CHI, the administrative rules 
ensure that justice remains the central point of concern. 
Additionally, the Montana Commission has adopted a rule 
stating that there can be a finding of discrimination when a place of 
public accommodation imposes qualification standards that tend to 
screen out members of a protected class unless such standards are 
“necessary” for the defendant.267 In this case, USA Ultimate’s 
tournament format tends to screen out BYU CHI from qualifying for 
subsequent rounds of the college postseason. This rule, however, is 
geared more toward the place of public accommodation’s initial 
qualification standards. In other words, USA Ultimate’s postseason 
 
 266. See supra notes 77–90 and accompanying text. 
 267. MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.609(2)(a) (Westlaw through Issue 5 of 2019 Mont. Admin. 
Register). 
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features a sequential progression of events that most conventional 
places of public accommodation would not. For instance, a 
conventional membership gym is a place of public accommodation 
that does not require its guests to advance past increasingly 
competitive levels in order to access the gym’s facilities. For example, 
if the membership gym imposed a qualification standard stating that 
people who wear a hijab are not allowed to become a member of the 
gym, there likely would be an unlawful discrimination because the 
gym would have a qualification standard that tends to screen out 
Muslim women. USA Ultimate’s weekend schedule, even if BYU 
CHI could portray it as a qualification standard, would fall outside 
this rule’s ambit. 
For the reasons given above, BYU CHI does not appear 
positioned to succeed under Montana’s anti-discrimination statute or 
administrative rules. As such, BYU CHI’s options under Montana 
law run aground. 
b. Washington 
The Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) 
protects an individual’s right to be free from discrimination because 
of religion, which includes “[t]he right to the full enjoyment of any of 
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place 
of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.”268 
Procedurally, anyone injured by a discriminatory act has the right to 
civil action in a state court.269 That person can instead choose to bring 
the action to the State’s Human Rights Commission, which has the 
power to adjudicate discrimination cases.270 
The WLAD broadly defines “full enjoyment,” which expands 
beyond simply allowing a member of a protected class to be admitted 
to a public accommodation to include a right to be treated as 
“welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited.”271 In the public 
accommodations context, the WLAD also prohibits “any person or 
the person’s agent or employee [from committing] an act which 
directly or indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, or 
discrimination” based on a person’s membership in a protected 
class.272 The Washington Supreme Court has determined that 
 
 268. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §	49.60.030(1) (Westlaw through Chapter 9 of 2019 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 269. Id. §	49.60.030(2). 
 270. Id. §	49.60.230(1)(a). One may appeal from the administrative level to the trial 
court level. Id. §	49.60.270. 
 271. Id. §	49.60.040(14). 
 272. Id. §	49.60.215. 
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discriminating against someone in the public accommodations context 
based on the person’s membership in a protected class is “an affront 
to personal dignity,” and that a central purpose of the WLAD is to 
protect people from such an affront.273 “This broad standard focuses 
the liability inquiry on whether actions resulted in discrimination, not 
whether the proprietor of a place of public accommodation intended 
to discriminate.”274 
Washington courts have looked to comparability of treatment in 
public accommodation discrimination cases.275 The state’s anti-
discrimination law aims primarily to address situations where 
defendants refuse or withhold access to places of public 
accommodation and their facilities.276 Courts aim to avoid 
overburdening businesses by providing them some latitude “in 
achieving the goal of comparable treatment.”277 
Washington has adopted a burden-shifting approach for 
determining whether discrimination has occurred in a place of public 
accommodation.278 First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case 
of unlawful discrimination.279 To do so, a plaintiff must prove that  
(1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) the 
defendant’s establishment is a place of public accommodation, 
(3) the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff when it did 
not treat the plaintiff in a manner comparable to the treatment 
it provides to persons outside that class, and (4) the plaintiff’s 
protected status was a substantial factor that caused the 
discrimination.280  
If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, then the 
burden shifts to the defendant to give a “legitimate nondiscriminatory 
explanation for its action.”281 If the defendant succeeds, then the 
burden returns to the plaintiff, who must show that the defendant’s 
proffered explanation “is merely pretext for unlawful 
discrimination.”282 
 
 273. Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop., 434 P.3d 39, 42 (Wash. 2019). 
 274. Id. at 41; see also Lewis v. Doll, 765 P.2d 1341, 1345 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that lack of discriminatory intent was irrelevant). 
 275. Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1328 (Wash. 1996). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. at 1327; Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447, 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 279. Floeting, 434 P.3d at 41; Fell, 911 P.2d at 1328; Demelash, 20 P.3d at 456. 
 280. Floeting, 434 P.3d at 41. 
 281. Demelash, 20 P.3d at 456. 
 282. Id. 
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In Spry v. Peninsula School District,283 applying the state’s 
burden-shifting approach, parents sued a school district and included 
claims under the WLAD that the school district discriminated against 
the plaintiff’s children by treating them differently and less favorably 
than other children because they were racial and religious 
minorities.284 The parents claimed that requests for certain 
accommodations were “not addressed as timely as another person’s 
request” and that “the school discriminated in its discipline of [the] 
children.”285 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
school district; however, the Washington Court of Appeals found that 
the plaintiffs “failed to provide evidence of comparators” and so also 
“failed to establish a causal connection between their status as a 
protected class and any disparate treatment they may have 
received.”286 Thus, the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case 
of unlawful discrimination and thereby failed to state a claim under 
the WLAD.287 
Additionally, while Washington law affirmatively requires 
parties to accommodate certain other parties to avoid unlawful 
discrimination,288 such a requirement to accommodate has only been 
applied to the employment realm289 and to disability discrimination in 
places of public accommodation.290 Furthermore, the Washington 
Supreme Court has “decline[d] to import doctrines developed for the 
employment context into the public accommodations context.”291 
Thus, while some Washington courts have read into the WLAD a 
duty to accommodate in certain limited circumstances, those will not 
necessarily apply to the conflict between BYU CHI and USA 
Ultimate. For instance, the Washington Supreme Court recently held 
 
 283. No. 46782-8-II, 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 704 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2016). 
 284. Id. at *1–4. 
 285. Id. at *5. 
 286. Id. at *19–20. 
 287. Id. at *20; see also Demelash, 20 P.3d at 457 (observing that the plaintiff “failed to 
produce competent evidence that [the defendant’s] conduct towards him differed from its 
treatment” of people not within the defendant’s protected class or that “race/national 
origin constituted a substantial factor in motivating [the defendant’s] behavior,” but 
reversing the lower court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendant because 
the plaintiff sought discovery that “might have evidenced disparate treatment sufficient to 
permit [the plaintiff] to establish his prima facie case”). 
 288. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE §	162-32-020(2) (Westlaw through the 18-24 Wash. 
State Register) (requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodation for certain 
disabilities). 
 289. See, e.g., Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 325 P.3d 193, 203 (Wash. 2014) (en banc). 
 290. See, e.g., Wash. State Commc’n Access Project v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 293 P.3d 
413, 421–22 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing reasonable accommodations for disabilities 
in the public accommodations context). 
 291. Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop., 434 P.3d 39, 40 (Wash. 2019). 
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that an employer had an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate 
employees’ religious practices.292 That rule, however, does not graft 
onto cases of alleged religious discrimination in the public 
accommodations context though.293 
As with Montana law, the WLAD may provide some initial hope 
for BYU CHI but will ultimately provide no grounds for relief against 
USA Ultimate. Similar to Montana law, the WLAD initially benefits 
BYU CHI’s potential claim by expansively defining the full 
enjoyment of public accommodations to include the right to access 
and feel accepted at a place of public accommodation. Furthermore, 
Washington courts have construed the WLAD as establishing a 
statewide policy that discrimination is an affront to personal dignity, a 
declaration that also favors BYU CHI. Courts have acknowledged, 
however, that they must balance considerations of enforcing 
accommodations for members of protected classes with the reality 
that accommodations must be reasonable in order to avoid 
smothering businesses. That consideration benefits USA Ultimate. 
In the end, though, Washington’s burden-shifting test pushes the 
analysis in USA Ultimate’s favor. Under this test, BYU CHI should 
be able to establish a prima facie case because it qualifies as a 
member of a protected class; the tournament is a place of public 
accommodation; the team can assert that USA Ultimate treated other 
people and teams outside of BYU CHI’s protected class differently 
than BYU CHI; and the team’s membership in a protected class was a 
substantial factor in USA Ultimate’s allegedly discriminatory acts.294 
BYU CHI should be able to avoid the evidentiary pitfall that the Spry 
plaintiffs encountered because they can more easily point to 
comparative treatment. 
 
 292. Kumar, 325 P.3d at 200. Additionally, various theories—including disparate 
treatment and disparate impact—can be used to prove discrimination in the employment 
context. See Goodman v. Boeing Co., 877 P.2d 703, 712 n.7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). Since 
those theories may not necessarily apply in the nondisabilities public accommodations 
context, this Comment’s analysis will be contained to the test provided above. 
 293. Floeting, 434 P.3d at 40–41. 
 294. Ultimately, the third and fourth prongs may not be so straightforward. A court 
would require BYU CHI to show that USA Ultimate treated it differently than other 
teams that do not fall within BYU CHI’s protected class, and that USA Ultimate has not 
accommodated BYU CHI because of its membership in that protected class. USA 
Ultimate, however, arguably is not treating the team differently because of its membership 
in a protected class. Instead, it is treating the team the same as every other team by 
requiring it to compete in the conventional tournament format. What BYU CHI is asking 
for is a special accommodation. It is not asking to be treated like teams outside of its 
protected class. During early stages of litigation when the court would view these 
assertions in a light most favorable to BYU CHI, however, the court may be willing to 
accept the team’s argument. Due to the strike-suit concerns that loom over this type of 
conflict, that early-litigation benefit greatly strengthens BYU CHI’s position. 
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The state’s burden-shifting approach, however, decisively turns 
the tide in USA Ultimate’s favor. If BYU CHI establishes its prima 
facie case, then USA Ultimate would need to give a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. As stated earlier, USA 
Ultimate would need to assert that it has adopted and adhered to the 
weekend tournament format to accommodate student-athletes’ 
academic schedules and to include the appropriate number of games 
in the tournament. They would undoubtedly meet their burden. BYU 
CHI would then need to prove that USA Ultimate’s explanation is an 
unbelievable discriminatory pretext, which it will not be able to do. 
As a result, Washington law provides no remedy for BYU CHI. 
c. Utah 
The Utah Civil Rights Act295 (“UCRA”) broadly recognizes that 
“the practice of discrimination on the basis of .	.	. religion .	.	. 
endangers the health, safety, and general welfare of [Utah] and its 
inhabitants.”296 The legislation also establishes that discrimination on 
the basis of religion in places of public accommodation “violates the 
public policy of [Utah].”297 That sweeping statutory language has been 
interpreted as an “explicit guarantee of equal treatment [that] reflects 
Utah’s public policy” to treat all people fairly and equally and to 
prevent unlawful discrimination in places of public accommodation.298 
Furthermore, the UCRA charges courts with the responsibility to 
construe this legislation “liberally .	.	. with a view to promote the 
policy and purposes of [the UCRA] and to promote justice.”299 The 
Utah Supreme Court has determined that this language “amply 
demonstrates that the legislature intended [the UCRA] to be 
construed as broadly as possible to combat invidious discrimination in 
Utah.”300 The legislation contains some breathing room for places of 
public accommodation to craft uniform standards, however, by stating 
that “[n]othing in [the UCRA] shall be construed to deny any person 
 
 295. Although the pertinent statutory chapter is labeled “Civil Rights,” Utah courts 
consistently refer to the statutes collectively as the “Utah Civil Rights Act.” See, e.g., Elks 
Lodges No. 719 (Ogden) v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1191 
(Utah 1995); World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 
257 (Utah 1994); Benyon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, Benevolent & Protective 
Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 514 (Utah 1993). This Comment will follow suit. 
 296. UTAH CODE ANN. §	13-7-1 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.). 
 297. Id.; see also id. §	13-7-3 (stating that all people in Utah “are free and equal and are 
entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, goods and 
services in .	.	. all places of public accommodation .	.	. without discrimination on the basis 
of .	.	. religion”). 
 298. MacArthur v. San Juan Cty., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1181 (D. Utah 2005). 
 299. §	13-7-1. 
 300. Benyon, 854 P.2d at 517. 
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the right to regulate the operation of a .	.	. place of public 
accommodation .	.	. in a manner which applies uniformly to all 
persons without regard to .	.	. religion.”301 
Additionally, the UCRA provides parties that are subject to 
unlawful discrimination a cause of action and ability to sue in court.302 
The relevant statute states that any place of public accommodation 
that unlawfully discriminates against a member of a protected class is 
a “public nuisance” and may be enjoined as provided in the statute.303 
Furthermore, the statute grants any person against whom unlawful 
discrimination occurs a civil cause of action “for damages and any 
other remedy available in law or equity against any person who 
[unlawfully discriminates against him].”304 Finally, the statute protects 
defendants against frivolous lawsuits by allowing them to recover “all 
actual and necessary expenses incurred in” its defense.305 The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a defendant can recover attorney’s fees 
and court costs, but only when the presiding court concludes “that [a] 
plaintiff’s action, even if brought in good faith, was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation” or that a “plaintiff continued to 
litigate the claim after it had clearly become frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation.”306 
Few litigants have relied on the UCRA. As a result, Utah courts 
have had few chances to interpret the UCRA and provide guidance 
for future cases involving allegedly unlawful discrimination. Among 
the cases in which the Utah Supreme Court has relied on the UCRA, 
the court determined the following: (1) a county ordinance forbidding 
massage parlors from offering opposite-sex massages did not violate 
the UCRA because the court determined that the UCRA “cannot be 
so read as to entitle a member of the public to a massage by a 
member of the opposite sex”;307 (2) a nonprofit fraternal organization 
with membership criteria was subject to the UCRA despite the fact 
 
 301. §	13-7-3. 
 302. Id. §	13-7-4(3). Because Utah has no administrative body that has the authority to 
investigate or adjudicate claims of discrimination, plaintiffs are free to go straight to the 
courts. See id.  
 303. Id. §	13-7-4. 
 304. Id. §	13-7-4(3). 
 305. Id. §	13-7-4(4). 
 306. World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 262 
(Utah 1994) (establishing the attorney’s fees and court costs rule). In World Peace 
Movement, the Utah Supreme Court determined that even though the defendant in the 
case successfully defended against an unlawful discrimination claim against it, the lower 
court should not have awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and court costs because the 
plaintiff’s claim was a meritorious question of first impression for the court and was not 
frivolous as a matter of law. Id. at 259–62. 
 307. Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake Cty. Comm’n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1145–46 (Utah 1981). 
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that it was a private club because its liquor license rendered it an 
enterprise regulated by the state and thus within the ambit of the 
UCRA;308 (3) a membership organization subject to the UCRA 
violates that law when the organization denies membership to a 
person solely because of her gender;309 (4) a publication could not 
deny “advertising services on the basis of the religion of the person 
seeking those services,” but it “may discriminate on the basis of 
content even when content overlaps with a suspect classification like 
religion”;310 and (5) “passive discrimination” in the form of written 
policies that clearly discriminate but have not yet manifested in an 
overtly discriminatory act still qualify as unlawful discrimination.311 
The common thread that applies to the present dispute stems from 
the Utah Supreme Court’s assertion that the UCRA should be 
construed liberally to promote the public policy of ending unlawful 
discrimination,312 and that courts interpreting the UCRA should “err 
toward over-protection of the enlisted classes rather than toward 
under-protection.”313 Interestingly, Utah courts have not 
implemented a preferred mode of analysis for unlawful discrimination 
in the public accommodations context.314 
Unfortunately for BYU CHI, Utah does not provide a home 
court advantage. As with Montana and Washington law, the UCRA 
does initially look promising. The legislation establishes a broad 
 
 308. Benyon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, Benevolent & Protective Order of 
Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 514–15 (Utah 1993). 
 309. Id. at 518. The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that ruling just two years later in 
another case dealing with private fraternal organizations with liquor licenses. Elks Lodges 
No. 719 (Ogden) v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1206–07 (Utah 
1995). 
 310. World Peace, 879 P.2d at 257–58. The court provided a helpful hypothetical to 
illustrate this distinction: 
[A] Jewish-owned and -operated newspaper which serves a primarily Jewish 
community might lawfully refuse advertisements propagating anti-Semitic 
“religious” sentiments. However, that same newspaper could not single out 
members of an anti-Semitic religious group and refuse to accept advertisements, 
regardless of content, from any member of that group simply because they are a 
member of that group. Such discrimination, which is directed at the individual 
seeking to place the advertisement rather than at the content of the advertisement, 
is prohibited by the [UCRA]. 
Id. at 258. 
 311. Elks Lodges, 905 P.2d at 1205–06. 
 312. See id. at 1204; World Peace, 879 P.2d at 262; Benyon, 854 P.2d at 517. 
 313. Elks Lodges, 905 P.2d at 1204. 
 314. Utah courts have, however, used disparate impact and disparate treatment 
analyses in other contexts. See, e.g., Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 996 P.2d 1043, 1050–51 
(Utah 2000) (analyzing a housing discrimination claim using disparate impact and 
disparate treatment tests); Kunej v. Labor Comm’n, 306 P.3d 855, 862–63 (Utah Ct. App. 
2013) (analyzing an employment discrimination claim using a disparate impact test). 
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public policy against discrimination, which courts have construed 
liberally to ensure protection for members of the enumerated suspect 
classes.315 Despite that judicial recognition, Utah courts have found 
unlawful discrimination in places of public accommodation only in 
instances where there was clear intent to discriminate.316 For example, 
the courts have found discrimination when fraternal organizations 
refused to accept female members and had standing policies of 
accepting only male members.317 On the other hand, the Utah 
Supreme Court did not find unlawful discrimination when a 
publication refused to publish a religious group’s advertisement 
because the court found that the publisher refused the business not 
because of the group’s religion but because of its message.318 Thus, 
while Utah courts have acknowledged the statutory call to liberally 
construe the UCRA, they have not equated this call to an automatic 
win for plaintiffs. Instead, the courts simply lean toward 
overprotection. 
Furthermore, the UCRA statutory language includes a provision 
critical to any defense USA Ultimate would present: “Nothing in [the 
UCRA] shall be construed to deny any person the right to regulate 
the operation of a .	.	. place of public accommodation .	.	. in a manner 
which applies uniformly to all persons without regard to .	.	. 
religion.”319 While this provision has not been litigated—and thus not 
interpreted by Utah courts—it protects defendants that have a 
uniform rule or policy that is not designed to distinguish people based 
on characteristics associated with a suspect class. USA Ultimate falls 
into that enumerated exception because it regulates its tournaments 
in a manner that applies uniformly to all teams without regard to any 
characteristics associated with a suspect class. Thus, even under a 
liberal construction of the UCRA in favor of protecting members of 
protected classes, the statute’s express language shields USA 
Ultimate. 
The statutory preference to protect members of suspect classes 
falls short of sustaining BYU CHI’s potential case because the statute 
includes an exception for uniform and facially neutral policies. Since 
Utah courts have not rendered decisions on many public 
 
 315. Benyon, 854 P.2d at 517. 
 316. See, e.g., id. at 517–19 (holding that a woman was entitled to relief as a matter of 
law after a place of public accommodation refused to admit her as a member solely 
because she was a female). 
 317. Elks Lodges, 905 P.2d at 1205–07. 
 318. World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 258 
(Utah 1994). 
 319. UTAH CODE ANN. §	13-7-3 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.). 
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accommodations cases or developed a consistent analytical 
framework for such cases, there may be some room for creative 
litigating. Ultimately, however, BYU CHI would likely not succeed 
under Utah law. 
d. Idaho 
Idaho law establishes that “[t]he right to be free from 
discrimination because of .	.	. creed .	.	. is recognized as and declared 
to be a civil right,” including the “right to the full enjoyment of any of 
the accommodations, facilities or privileges of any place of public 
resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement.”320 Specifically, 
the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) “secure[s] for all individuals 
within the state freedom from discrimination” because of religion in 
connection with access to and use of public accommodations.321 The 
IHRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion that results in 
the denial of the “full and equal enjoyment” of places of public 
accommodation.322 One who believes he or she has been unlawfully 
 
 320. IDAHO CODE §	18-7301 (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). Under 
this particular statutory chapter, any person who denies another, on the basis of religion, 
the full enjoyment of a public accommodation is guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. §	18-7303. 
This statute is part of the penal code, however, and creates no private right of action. See 
Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 908 P.2d 1228, 1233–34 (Idaho 1995). The Idaho Human 
Rights Act, discussed below, provides for civil recourse in the discrimination context. 
 321. IDAHO CODE §	67-5901(2) (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 322. Id. §	67-5909(5). Subsection (5) specifically states that it is prohibited “[f]or a 
person .	.	.	[t]o deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of a place of public 
accommodation.” Id. Separately, subsection (6) of the statute may prohibit one who 
“owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation” from imposing “eligibility 
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out” individuals who are in a protected class or 
not modifying “policies, practices, or procedures” when they tend to exclude people in a 
protected class, unless “such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the 
place of public accommodation’s] goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or 
accommodations.” Id. §	67-5909(6)(b)–(c). 
The drafting of the statute, however, makes application of those particular provisions 
in this context unclear. The statute begins by stating that “[i]t shall be a prohibited act to 
discriminate against a person because of, or on a basis of .	.	. religion .	.	. in any of the 
following subsections.” Id. §	67-5909 (emphasis added). The statute then specifies that 
discriminating on the basis of disability is disallowed as provided in certain subsections, 
including subsection (6). Id. Subsection (6) is accordingly drafted to prohibit 
discrimination in places of public accommodation “on the basis of disability.” See id. §	67-
5909(6). The provisions in subsection (6) also provide protections, such as requiring places 
of public accommodation to make reasonable accommodations for people with 
disabilities, that are generally given in the public accommodations context only for people 
with disabilities and not for people in other protected classes. See, e.g., Fell v. Spokane 
Transit Auth., 911 P.2d 1319, 1323 (Wash. 1996) (stating that a place of public 
accommodation can comply with the state’s anti-discrimination laws by providing 
reasonable accommodations for a “disabled person’s disability”). In other words, the 
statute starts by stating that all of its subsections prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
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discriminated against can initiate legal proceedings by filing a 
complaint with the Idaho Human Rights Commission (“Idaho 
Commission”), an administrative body under the state government.323 
A complainant must exhaust administrative avenues before filing in 
state court.324 
Unfortunately, as with the other states, there is little case law in 
this area. Most cases that have involved the IHRA are in the 
employment context,325 and courts have adopted consistent analytical 
frameworks only in employment discrimination cases.326 One case in 
the United States District Court for the District of Idaho actually 
analyzed alleged religious discrimination against a Mormon in a 
 
religion, but then it provides a subsection that, by its own language, deals specifically with 
discrimination in the disability context and provides public accommodations protections 
that are generally given only to people with disabilities and not to people in other 
protected classes. Further adding to the confusion, subsection (5) also prohibits 
discrimination in places of public accommodation, and does so broadly and in a manner 
that conventionally applies to protect members of all protected classes. §	67-5909(5). 
Additionally, subsection (5) does not require places of public accommodation to modify 
policies or provide reasonable accommodations. Id.  
In essence, the statute asserts that all subsections apply to all protected classes but 
then provides a subsection that states that it applies to people with disabilities and 
provides public accommodations protections traditionally given only in the disabilities 
context. This confusion may stem from a 2005 amendment to the statute that added the 
disability subsection. See Act of Apr. 5, 2005, ch. 278, sec. 4, §	67-5909, 2005 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 869, 872–75 (codified at IDAHO CODE §	67-5909 (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 
2019 Reg. Sess.)). If the reasonable accommodations rule were to apply to all protected 
classes, and not just those with disabilities, then places of public accommodation would 
need to reasonably accommodate people for characteristics associated with their protected 
class. In this case, that would mean USA Ultimate would be exposed to liability much 
more than it is in other states, and it might be forced to provide reasonable 
accommodations to BYU CHI because of the team’s religious needs. The statute is 
unclearly drafted, however, so that issue remains unclear. Due to that unclear drafting, 
and taking into account that the reasonable accommodations provided in subsection (6) 
generally apply only in the disabilities context, this Comment assumes that only subsection 
(5) applies and that USA Ultimate would not be subject to the reasonable 
accommodations rule provided in subsection (6). 
 323. IDAHO CODE §	67-5907(1) (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 324. See id. §	67-5908(2). Courts have confirmed that a claim under the IHRA must 
start with the Idaho Commission, which was created to oversee these types of issues. See 
Boyle v. Jerome Country Club, 883 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (D. Idaho 1995).  
 325. See, e.g., Stout v. Key Training Corp., 158 P.3d 971, 973–74 (Idaho 2007) 
(concluding that the IHRA did not entitle an employee who won an employment 
discrimination lawsuit to attorney’s fees); Foster, 908 P.2d at 1232–33 (analyzing whether 
the IHRA contemplated “individual liability for an employer’s agents and employees”); 
O’Dell v. Basabe, 810 P.2d 1082, 1096 (Idaho 1991) (determining that “front pay is a 
permissible element of damages under the [IHRA]” in employment discrimination cases). 
 326. See, e.g., Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 745–50 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(employing disparate treatment and disparate impact tests in an employment age 
discrimination case); Bowles v. Keating, 606 P.2d 458, 462–65 (Idaho 1979) (using 
disparate treatment and disparate impact tests in a case concerning sex discrimination in 
the employment context). 
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sports context similar to the dispute at issue between USA Ultimate 
and BYU CHI,327 but the court reviewed only Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and not the IHRA.328 Because there have been few 
cases, Idaho courts also have not had the opportunity to further 
ingrain public policy against unlawful discrimination by construing 
the IHRA liberally. 
Additionally, few complaints have been filed with the Idaho 
Commission.329 The Idaho Commission has stated that it will construe 
its own anti-discrimination rules liberally “to secure just, speedy and 
economical determination of all issues presented” to it.330 It does not, 
however, specifically say that it will construe the IHRA liberally.331 
Finally, the Idaho Commission does provide some guidance on its 
website: “Individuals should not be treated more or less favorably in 
[the public accommodations context] because of their religious beliefs 
or practices. Decisions about providing service .	.	. should be made 
without regard to someone’s religious preferences.”332 
Yet again, undeveloped case law renders analyzing this issue in 
this state difficult. Idaho’s statutes also establish a public policy that 
opposes all forms of discrimination against people in protected 
classes, but Idaho courts have not had the opportunity to show how 
far this public policy reaches. The IHRA does broadly state that one 
cannot “deny an individual [in a protected class] the full and equal 
enjoyment of” places of public accommodation,333 but the statute 
indicates that one cannot deny “because of” religion,334 which implies 
that the statute looks more toward intent than effect. The lack of case 
law or administrative guidance also makes analysis difficult, but the 
Idaho Commission’s statement that “[i]ndividuals should not be 
treated more or less favorably” in this context335 evinces an intent to 
allow facially neutral policies or structures, such as a tournament 
 
 327. See generally Boyle, 883 F. Supp. 1422 (dealing with a claim of religious 
discrimination in the public accommodations context when a Mormon professional golfer 
sued a golf course to allow him to play all of his rounds on the Saturday of a golf 
tournament in order to allow him not to play on a Sunday). The court ruled for the golf 
course after undertaking a burden-shifting analysis. Id. at 1429–33. 
 328. See id. at 1428–32. 
 329. Religion, IDAHO HUM. RTS. COMMISSION, https://humanrights.idaho.gov/Idaho-
Law/Types-of-Discrimination/Religion [https://perma.cc/DAG3-RPXB] (“Claims of 
religious discrimination in [the public accommodations context] are not made very 
frequently to the Commission.”). 
 330. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 45.01.01.004 (LEXIS through July 1, 2018). 
 331. See id. r. 45.01.01.012 (addressing the commission’s interpretation of the IHRA 
and stating only that certain federal statutes can provide guidance). 
 332. Religion, supra note 329. 
 333. IDAHO CODE §	67-5909(5) (LEXIS through Chapter 197 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 334. Id. §	67-5909 (emphasis added). 
 335. Religion, supra note 329 (emphasis added). 
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schedule, to fall outside of unlawful discrimination. As a result, Idaho 
also does not appear to provide BYU CHI a fruitful forum. 
III.  A NEW STATE STATUTORY APPROACH 
The prior sections analyzed the potential avenues that BYU CHI 
could take to carry out its veiled threats to litigate its conflict with 
USA Ultimate if the governing organization does not find an 
acceptable tournament-scheduling compromise. Most sources of law 
provide the team with little hope of success. While some state laws 
may prove more promising, the lack of extensive precedent creates 
significant uncertainty. Courts that have settled upon a preferred 
mode of analysis have generally adopted a form of a burden-shifting 
approach. Often, those modes of analysis either rely on or combine 
intent-based and effect-based tests. 
The burden-shifting approach works well in many contexts, 
especially when a public accommodation refuses to serve or admit a 
member of a protected class. When a member of a protected class 
encounters a discriminatory system or structure, however, such as a 
rigid sports schedule, the burden-shifting test can be difficult to 
overcome because it is often hard to prove pretext that overcomes an 
ostensibly legitimate business reason to refuse to accommodate. As a 
result, while burden-shifting tests have their benefits, they can be 
heavy-handed. 
Unsurprisingly, not all instances of potential discrimination fall 
neatly into or are optimally resolved by the burden-shifting approach. 
The budding conflict between BYU CHI and USA Ultimate presents 
an example of such a dispute that is not easily resolved under such 
tests. USA Ultimate did not apparently intend to discriminate against 
BYU CHI’s predominantly Mormon team by creating the weekend 
tournament structure; however, BYU CHI is in a position where that 
structure results in a discriminatory effect, and the burden-shifting 
test may not appropriately take all of the case’s factors into 
consideration. 
This Comment proposes a dual analysis that combines aspects of 
the intent-based and effect-based aspects of burden-shifting tests in 
order to better address cases like the BYU CHI controversy and 
thereby fill a gap in the law. This new test would require a fact finder 
to undertake a three-step analysis. 
First, the fact finder would employ an intent-based approach. 
This initial step would resemble other intentional discrimination tests, 
where the fact finder would need to find that the plaintiff (1) is a 
member of a class protected under the statute, (2) attempted to access 
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or enjoy a place of public accommodation, (3) was denied that access 
and enjoyment, and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly 
situated persons who are not members of the protected class. After 
determining that the plaintiff passes this threshold determination, the 
court would assess whether the defendant intended to discriminate. If 
the alleged discrimination manifested in a refusal to provide service at 
or allow access to a place of public accommodation,336 the analysis 
should be confined to determining whether the defendant expressed 
or acted with animus in the discriminatory action. If, on the other 
hand, the fact finder faces an instance of discrimination that results 
more from the defendant’s system or structure,337 then the fact finder 
should analyze whether there was discriminatory intent or animus 
present in the creation of the system or structure. If the fact finder 
finds discriminatory intent or animus in either case, then the analysis 
should end there with a holding for the party harmed by the 
discrimination. If, on the other hand, the fact finder discovers no such 
discriminatory intent or animus, then it would move to the second 
step of the analysis. 
In the second step of the analysis, the fact finder would 
determine whether the defendant’s action or structure resulted in a 
discriminatory effect. Likely, if the plaintiff has made it this far in the 
analysis, this prong should be met. That is because the four-part test 
above determines whether the plaintiff has standing under the statute 
to meet the effect-based test; it determines that a member of a 
protected class tried to use a public accommodation and was denied 
even though others outside the protected class had access. If this 
finding is met, then the fact finder could move to the final step of the 
analysis. 
Under the third step, the fact finder would assess whether the 
defendant exhibited discriminatory intent or animus in the refusal to 
accommodate. For example, if a plaintiff of a protected class 
encounters some discriminatory effect by a defendant or their 
policies, yet there is no discriminatory intent or animus in the creation 
or implementation of that defendant’s system or policy, then the 
plaintiff may still succeed in proving discrimination if the defendant 
 
 336. For instance, a recent case relating to a cakeshop’s refusal to bake a wedding cake 
for a homosexual couple represents a prototypical example of a refusal to serve that 
results more from a one-off decision than from the implementation of some elemental 
structure of the cakeshop. See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (discussing whether a government commission violated 
the First Amendment when it evaluated a bakery that refused to make a cake for a gay 
couple). 
 337. For instance, the weekend tournament format that USA Ultimate uses does not 
constitute a one-off direct refusal to allow BYU CHI to participate. 
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exhibits discriminatory intent or animus in the refusal to 
accommodate the plaintiff. If a fact finder discovers discriminatory 
intent at this stage, then there is a finding of discrimination. 
This combined approach begins to fill a gap by combining intent- 
and effect-based approaches and allowing for findings of animus at 
multiple stages. While the third step may prove redundant or possibly 
inapplicable to directly discriminatory actions,338 it better and more 
fairly captures cases where a plaintiff encounters a system that may 
not have been established or structured with the intent to 
discriminate but which has the effect of discriminating. If a plaintiff 
collides with such a structure, bargains with the party presiding over 
that structure to seek accommodation, and the presiding party refuses 
to accommodate, then a plaintiff can attempt to prove discriminatory 
intent in the refusal to accommodate.339 This approach more fairly fills 
the gap by providing plaintiffs multiple opportunities to prove 
discrimination but still prevents a finding of discrimination if a 
defendant presides over a structure that has an inadvertent 
discriminatory effect on a suspect class. This test also replaces the 
often-insurmountable “pretext” stage of a burden-shifting approach 
by focusing on the animus in a refusal to accommodate instead of the 
business, logistical, or other reasons for refusing to accommodate. 
The test suggested above differs slightly from other tests in that 
the discriminatory intent or animus can be found not only in the 
establishment or operation of a system—such as an ultimate 
tournament—but also in the refusal to accommodate by changing the 
system. Despite the benefits of such a test, some drawbacks remain. 
First, just as effect-based approaches may encourage more litigious 
behavior by plaintiffs, this test’s inclusion of the effect-based step may 
 
 338. For example, if a proprietor of a place of public accommodation refuses to serve a 
member of a protected class, then the discriminatory intent is wrapped both in the action 
that would result in a finding of discrimination under the first step of the test and a finding 
at this stage. Of course, the fact finder should not reach this stage of the test if it finds 
under the first part of the test, so the third step likely would not apply in these instances. 
 339. One point of distinction that states would need to consider at this stage would be 
who carries the burden of proof. Up to this point, the plaintiff will have carried the 
burden, and that likely should continue. So, if the plaintiff were to carry the burden of 
proof at the third stage, then she would need to elicit convincing evidence of 
discriminatory intent in the defendant’s refusal to accommodate. On the other hand, states 
could opt to treat the discriminatory effect portion of the test as prima facie evidence of 
discrimination that the defendant would need to rebut. Under that test, the defendant 
likely would need to show a legitimate reason—for instance, convenience or necessity—
for why it refused to accommodate. Keeping the burden of proof with the plaintiff is the 
better course, however, because animus at this stage is more reasonably proven through 
proof of that animus than it is by whether the defendant can point to an alternative reason 
to refuse to accommodate, which the defendant could craft even if it did act 
discriminatorily. 
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similarly leave the door open to litigation. On the other hand, the fact 
remains that a plaintiff would still need to prove discriminatory intent 
or animus at some stage of its interaction with a defendant, which will 
remain a difficult burden in many cases.340 Thankfully, the entirety of 
the test dampens these negative aspects. The test assuages the first 
drawback by continuing to require some proof of discriminatory 
intent, which could stave off frivolous lawsuits. The test also lightens 
the second drawback because the analysis effectively requires the 
parties to bargain, discuss, or negotiate an accommodation for the 
plaintiff, which increases the likelihood that discriminatory intent or 
animus would manifest itself. Furthermore, even with the potential 
drawbacks, the test proffered above combines aspects of the intent-
oriented and effect-oriented aspects of the burden-shifting approach 
in a way that more accurately addresses discrimination that can arise 
in several ways and encourages the parties to address their differences 
outside of the court system. 
This hybrid test would apply more ideally in the BYU CHI and 
USA Ultimate dispute than conventional discrimination tests would. 
While a burden-shifting test appears to offer USA Ultimate a 
favorable outcome, this Comment’s dual test cuts much more closely 
to the meat of the issue. First, the fact finder would determine 
whether BYU CHI has standing under the statute as a member of a 
protected class that attempted to access or enjoy a place of public 
accommodation but was denied even though the space was open to 
others outside the class. The fact finder would then assess whether 
USA Ultimate constructed the weekend tournament format with 
discriminatory intent or animus.341 If the fact finder were to find such 
animus, the analysis would end and BYU CHI would win. On the 
other hand, if the fact finder were not to find such animus, then she 
would assess whether the tournament format resulted in 
discriminatory effect. If so, then the fact finder would undertake the 
final part of the analysis and ascertain whether USA Ultimate 
 
 340. In other words, not all parties acting with discriminatory intent will manifest that 
intent such that the plaintiff can prove it. Sophisticated parties conscious of anti-
discrimination laws may be shrewd or well counseled enough to avoid expressing its 
animus. This fact, of course, intersects with the burden-of-proof issue discussed supra note 
339. Directly proving discriminatory intent may be difficult for the plaintiff, but shifting 
the burden to the defendant easily allows it to craft creative reasons for the refusal to 
accommodate after the discriminatory act. Someone must carry the burden, however, and 
it makes sense to require the party alleging discrimination to prove it. Perhaps courts 
could allow plaintiffs to allege lack of alternative reasons to accommodate as probative of 
intent in order to shift some of the upper hand back to the plaintiff. 
 341. In other words, the court would determine whether USA Ultimate created the 
weekend tournament format in order to block Mormons from participating. 
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exhibited discriminatory intent or animus in its refusal to 
accommodate BYU CHI. Discussions between the parties concerning 
accommodation would provide some prediscovery evidence that the 
court could analyze, and later discovery could provide further 
evidence potentially probative of the defendant’s intent.342 Of course, 
issues concerning USA Ultimate’s proffered reasons for refusal to 
accommodate—namely, convenience for the participating student-
athletes—would arise too. If the fact finder discovered discriminatory 
intent at this stage, then BYU CHI would have a much better chance 
of succeeding. If not, then USA Ultimate likely would win. Either 
way, the test would have better captured and addressed the issue that 
the parties were facing. 
CONCLUSION 
BYU CHI has developed from a good team to a powerful 
program in the past several years under Coach Bryce Merrill. Time 
and again, the team has proven its national relevance, beating ranked 
teams and earning its own high rankings in the process. The team’s 
desire to seek an accommodation from USA Ultimate that would 
allow them to participate meaningfully in the postseason—what any 
athlete in any sport desires—is elementally understandable and 
reasonable. To their credit, the team has continued to petition USA 
Ultimate and generate conversation in the ultimate community in a 
professional and productive manner. 
With the threat of litigation looming over the parties and the 
effective strike-suit precedent laid down by BYU’s men’s rugby team, 
however, an analysis of the potential founts of legal recourse is 
prudent. As the analysis above shows, current federal and state laws 
appear to heavily favor USA Ultimate because of the prevalence of 
burden-shifting approaches or the wording of statutes. In reality, 
these approaches do not optimally cut to the center of conflicts that 
involve facially neutral structures or systems that have a 
discriminatory effect. That is the conflict developing between BYU 
CHI and USA Ultimate. 
To address the gap that results from the burden-shifting 
approach, this Comment proposes a new test that retains desirable 
features of the conventional tests while also better addressing 
instances where nuanced discriminatory intent or effect may not be 
 
 342. Ideally, courts would allow only a limited form of discovery in order to help the 
parties avoid significant litigation costs at this stage. If full discovery were allowed too 
early, then strike-suit concerns would continue to play too great a role and potentially 
force settlements on frivolous claims. 
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adequately addressed by the conventional tests. Using the ultimate 
dispute that frames this Comment as an example, the proposed test 
more neatly dissects the issues embedded within the potential 
discrimination and is thus more likely to bring about a just result. 
GRAHAM F. WHITTINGTON** 
 
 **  I thank my primary editor, James McLeod, for his helpful comments and steady 
hand throughout the editing process. I also thank Brooke Watson for her considerable 
efforts in the late stages of editing. Additionally, I thank the other members of the North 
Carolina Law Review Board and Staff who have contributed much to carry this work to 
publication. Professor Andy Hessick helped me turn my vague ideas into a thesis, and 
Professor Richard Myers has helped keep my love for ultimate alive during law school. I 
thank those two and the many other professors at Carolina Law who have supported me 
throughout my time here. Finally, I thank all of my friends and family who have put me in 
a position to publish academic work in law school. My parents and siblings set me up for 
success and continue to support me. My fiancé, Katie Kalivoda, and her parents also 
deserve my deep thanks for their love and support. 
